

VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

忠信ハ九郎判官義經の臣ナリて
和列吉野山ニ君の安ヲ出エ
取千の衆徒ヲ切殺シ都ヲ来
シテ母ヲ宅ニ忍ビテ訴人有
テ北條時政の從中時定數千の士
ニテ居所ヲ入ル忠信ハ合シ基
盤ヲ以テ烈ニ戦ハシ從士見テ當
ラズ後ニテ隙ヲ佐藤ハ自殺ト
シテ死ス

GO WORLD

SUMMER 1995 NO. 73



佐藤忠信



KISEIDO PUBLISHING COMPANY

忠信
本為梓


JAL MILEAGE BANK NOW STRETCHES YOUR MILES FURTHER.

Your mileage benefits add up quicker thanks to a new tie-up between Japan Airlines and American Airlines.

JAL and American Airlines are respectively the largest airlines in Japan and the U.S. according to ton/kilo data from IATA World Air Transport Statistics ('93).



American Airlines is a registered trademark of American Airlines, Inc.



Japan Airlines now makes your flight miles go further through a new tie-up with American Airlines. All miles logged on American Airlines' international and domestic routes can be added to your JAL MILEAGE BANK along with miles accrued on JAL's international flights and all Japan Asia Airways routes. To make use of this new system, please provide your JAL MILEAGE BANK membership number when making reservations on American Airlines' flights.

Your mileage benefits have also expanded thanks to this new tie-up. In addition to earning free tickets on JAL flights, first class seats, upgrade services and hotel coupons, you also earn free tickets and upgrade services on American Airlines flights.

The earlier you join the JAL MILEAGE BANK, the quicker you can start earning these great benefits.



As of May, 1995



Information on how to join the JAL MILEAGE BANK and other details can be obtained from your local JAL branch.

CONTENTS

Go World News	2
Message to our Readers	6
Determining Life or Death by Breath Patterns	7
Three Elementary Problems	9
Double Ko Stones and Double Hot Stones	10
An Introduction to Tesuji (ii)	11
The 20th Tengen Title Match: Game Four (Rin Kaiho v. Ryu Shikun)	13
The 19th Kisei Title Match (Cho Chikun v. Kobayashi Satoru)	17
Game One	18
Game Two	24
Game Three	25
Game Four	31
Game Five	34
Game Six	37
The 33rd Judan Title Match (Otake Hideo v. Yoda Norimoto)	45
Game One	45
Game Two	47
Game Three	49
Important Stones and Useless Stones	52
An Introduction to Tesuji (ii): Answers	55
Ten Proverbs Every Go Player Should Know	58
The 17th World Amateur Go Championship	63

Cover: Go Board Tadanobu. An oban print by Toshinobu, published in 1889. It depicts Sato Sadanobu fighting off his opponents with a go board. Refer to *Go World* 63 for the story.

Go World is published by Kiseido Publishing Company, CPO Box 2126, Tokyo, Japan.

Editor: Richard Bozulich

North American subscribers may order from:

Kiseido Publishing Company
454 Las Gallinas Ave., #255, San Rafael, CA
ZIP: 94903-3618; Tel: 415-499-1543;
e-mail: kiseido@crl.com
US\$20 per year; single copy: US\$6

European subscribers may order from:

Shaak en Gowinkel het Paard
Haarlemmerdijk 147
1013 KH Amsterdam, Holland
Tel: +31-20-624-1171; FAX: +31-20-627-0885
Price: f12.50 (Dutch guilders) per issue

GO WORLD (ISSN 0286-0376) is distributed quarterly for \$20.00 per year by Kiseido. Second-class postage paid at San Rafael, CA.

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to KISEIDO, 454 Las Gallinas Ave., #255, San Rafael, CA 94903-3618.

Note: Japanese, Chinese and Korean names are given with the family name first. The Pinyin romanization system is used for mainland Chinese names.

© Copyright 1995 by Kiseido Publishing Company (ISSN 0286-0376). Printed in Japan.

All rights reserved according to international law. This magazine or any parts thereof may not be reproduced in any form without the written permission of the publisher.

Go World News

News from Japan

Kato Becomes the Honinbo Challenger

After rebuffing the challenges from two young players in the Honinbo league, Kato Masao has earned the right to challenge Cho Chikun for the Honinbo title.

Kato is no newcomer to the Honinbo tournament. In 1969, as a 5-dan, he startled the go world by becoming the lowest-ranked challenger ever for a major title. He lost this first bid to Rin Kaiho by a respectable score of 2-4, but eight years later he was to return to take the title from Takemiya Masaki and hold it for three consecutive terms, from 1977 to 1979. Now, after an absence of 15 years, he is back again as challenger.

Kato was the frontrunner in this year's league from the beginning. Midway through the league, Kato was leading with four straight wins, but Yo Kagen, a young player from Taiwan, was close behind with four wins and one loss. Then Kato dropped a game to Yuki Satoshi, and it seemed that it would now be a contest between Yo and Kato to decide the challenger. But Kato lost to Yamashiro and Yo went down when he came up against the formidable Kobayashi Koichi. Going into the final

round, Kato, Yo, and Yuki each had four wins against two losses. In this last round, played on April 13, Kato faced Yo, and Yuki was pitted against Komatsu Hideki 8-dan. Kato beat Yo and Yuki defeated Komatsu. Since Kato and Yuki had identical scores of five wins against two losses, a playoff was held on April 20. Having lost his first encounter to Yuki in this league, Kato must have been especially determined not to lose again in the playoff. He crushed Yuki, forcing him to resign after 177 moves.

In spite of the fact that neither Yuki nor Yo became the challenger, they have retained their places for next year's league and are well positioned to renew their bids to become the challenger. Joining them will be O Rissei, another Taiwanese player who ended the league with a 4-3 record. Dropped from the league are last year's challenger, Kataoka Satoshi, and Yamashiro Hiroshi, who challenged for the title in 1986, 1987, and 1993. Also dropped was Kobayashi Koichi Meijin, who seems to be in somewhat of a slump.

After Cho's disastrous showing in the Kisei title match, everyone will be watching to see if he has recovered his usual form. On the other hand, having lost his Oza title to Cho, which he held for a total of 11 terms (eight of them consecutive), in autumn last year, Kato will be determined to redeem himself.

If the result of the first game of the title match, played in Seoul, Korea, on May 10-11, are any indication, it seems as if Cho has regained his form. Playing White, he defeated Kato by 3 1/2 points. The second game will be played on May 24-25.

Late news: Kato won the second game.

Cho Leads the Meijin League

With this year's Meijin league more than half finished, Cho Chikun looks like the favorite to become the challenger with five wins and no losses. Close on his heels, however, are Takemiya Masaki and O Rissei, both with four wins and one loss. Cho is scheduled to meet these two players later this summer. Whether or not Cho becomes the challenger will hinge on the results of these two games.



50th Honinbo League. Title holder: Cho Chikun (final result)

Rank		Ka	Ya	O	Kom	Kob	Kato	Yuki	Yo	Won	Lost
1	Kataoka Satoshi		⊕	⊖	⊕	⊕	⊖	⊖	⊖	3	4
2	Yamashiro Hiroshi	⊖		⊕	⊕	⊖	⊕	⊖	⊖	3	4
3	O Rissei	⊕	⊖		⊕	⊕	⊖	⊕	⊖	4	3
4	Komatsu Hideki	⊖	⊖	⊖		⊖	⊖	⊖	⊕	1	6
5	Kobayashi Koichi	⊖	⊕	⊖	⊕		⊖	⊖	⊕	3	4
5	Kato Masao	⊕	⊖	⊕	⊕	⊕		⊖	⊕	5	2
5	Yuki Satoshi	⊕	⊕	⊖	⊕	⊕	⊕		⊖	5	2
5	Yo Kagen	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊖	⊖	⊖	⊕		4	3

⊕ = won with Black; ⊖ = lost with Black; ⊕ = won with White; ⊖ = lost with White

The 20th Gosei Tournament

The quarterfinals of the Gosei tournament have been played. Among the four players who will meet in the semifinals are Kobayashi Satoru, the new Kisei, and Fujisawa Shuko, the honorary Kisei. This clash between the old and the new Kiseis could be an exciting one. Kobayashi is clearly in the best form he has ever been, and everyone expects Shuko to put out his best effort to defeat this young Kisei. In spite of his age and bad health, Shuko is still a force to contend with on the go board. Three and a half years ago he won the Oza title, and the next year he successfully defended it against the then reigning Kisei, Kobayashi Koichi. When his honor is at stake, Fujisawa is capable of putting out that extra effort.

The other semifinal game will be played

between Hisajima 9-dan and Komatsu Hideki 8-dan, a promising young player.

The 43rd Oza Tournament

The first round of the final tournament to determine the challenger for the Oza title is over. The quarterfinal games to be played over the next two months are as follows: Kobayashi Koichi vs. Rin Kaiho, Sonoda Yuichi vs. Yamada Kimio 6-dan, O Rissei vs. Kurahashi Masayuki, Yamashiro Hiroshi vs. Otake Hideo.

*International Tournaments***The 8th Fujitsu Cup**

This year's Fujitsu Cup is turning out to be a triumph for the Japanese and a rout for Korea's big guns. Players from Japan will be

20th Meijin League. Title Holder: Kobayashi Koichi (as of 95/5/26)

Rank		Rin	Cho	Kato	Kata	Take	Awa	O	O	Yuki	Won	Lost
1	Rin Kaiho		⊖	⊖	⊕		⊕	⊖	⊕		3	3
2	Cho Chikun	⊕		⊕	⊕				⊕	⊕	5	0
3	Kato Masao	⊕	⊖		⊕		⊕	⊖		⊕	4	2
4	Kataoka Satoshi	⊖	⊖	⊖		⊖	⊕	⊕			2	4
5	Takemiya Masaki				⊕		⊕	⊖	⊕	⊕	4	1
6	Awaji Shuzo	⊖		⊖	⊖	⊖			⊕		1	4
7	O Rissei	⊕		⊕	⊖	⊕				⊕	4	1
7	O Meien	⊖	⊖			⊖	⊖			⊖	0	5
7	Yuki Satoshi		⊖	⊖		⊖		⊖	⊕		1	4

⊕ = won with Black; ⊖ = lost with Black; ⊕ = won with White; ⊖ = lost with White



Kobayashi Satoru (left), on his way to defeating Cho Hun-hyun in the 8th Fujitsu Cup

represented in all four games of the quarter-finals to be held in China on June 3. Rin Kaiho Gosei will play China's Meijin Ma Xiaochun, Cho Chikun Honinbo will play Yu Bin, Kobayashi Koichi Meijin will play Cao Dayuan, and Kobayashi Satoru Kisei will play Yoo Chang-hyeok, the winner of the 1993 Fujitsu Cup and the only Korean player to survive the first two rounds of this year's tournament. The semifinals are scheduled to be held in Osaka on July 1 and the finals in Tokyo on August 5.

Two of Korea's top players, Seo Bong-soo and Cho Hun-hyun, the winner of last year's Fujitsu Cup, fell to Kobayashi Satoru. Another Korean hopeful who did not fare well was *wunderkind* Lee Chang-ho, who lost to Kobayashi Koichi. Cho Chikun disposed of another Korean player Jang Soo-young.

Two other casualties in the first two rounds were Nie Weiping, who lost to Yoo Chang-Hyeok, and Jimmy Cha from the US, who was quickly disposed of by Cao Dayuan. The only seeded Japanese player failing to make it into the quarterfinals was Kato Maso, who was eliminated by Ma Xiaochun.

The 10th China-Japan Super Go Series: The NEC Cup

The 10th China-Japan Super Go Series is now under way. This year the Japanese have

fielded a team billed as the strongest ever. It includes three players from the younger generation: Ryu Shikun Tengen, Morita Michihiro 7-dan, and Mimura Tomoyasu Shinjin-O. In addition, Kobayashi Satoru, the new Kisei, has also been entered. Rin Kaiho Gosei and Otake Hideo, who was Judan at the time the team was chosen, will provide these younger players with back-up, should it be needed. The female representative for the Japanese side is the Women's Meijin, Kato Tomoko.

The Chinese side, however, will be no pushover. Their team is made up of five of China's biggest guns, including Ma Xiaochun, the Chinese Meijin, and Nie Weiping. Hua Xueming 7-dan is the female player. The lowest ranked player is Chang Hao 6-dan.

In this tournament each team has seven players. The players on each team are fielded in a certain order, and each player plays until he is defeated. The team that defeats all the players of the other team is the victor. The winning team receives ¥9,000,000 and the losing team ¥2,500,000.

The line-up for this year's Super Go is as follows:

<i>Japanese Team</i>	<i>Chinese Team</i>
1. Kato Tomoko	Hua Xaming
2. Mimura Tomoyasu	Chang Hao

- | | |
|---------------------|---------------|
| 3. Morita Michihiro | Yu Bin |
| 4. Ryu Shikun | Cao Dayuan |
| 5. Kobayashi Satoru | Liu Xiaoguang |
| 6. Rin Kaiho | Ma Xiaochun |
| 7. Otake Hideo | Nie Weiping |

The first round between Kato Tomoko and Hua Xueming was played in Beijing at the Chinese Weiqi Association's headquarters on April 17. Kato, who played Black, made a rash move in the middle game and was forced to resign after 192 moves. In the next round, played two days later, Mimura Tomoyasu overpowered Hua to even the score.

In the third round, to be held in Tokyo on June 1, Mimura will face Chang Hao.

Cho Hun-hyun Wins the 3rd Jinro Cup

The last two games of the 3rd Jinro Cup, the SBS World Championship, were played in Seoul on February 21 and 22. After defeating Lee Chang-ho and Kato Masao, China's iron goalkeeper, Nie Weiping, needed two more wins to take the title. However, in spite of having a good game, Nie, playing White, finally fell to Korea's Cho Hun-hyun, losing by 8 1/2 points.

This victory put Cho into the final against Rin Kaiho. Although Rin had a won game, he made a mistake on move 173 and resigned after 200 moves. This is the third time that victory in this three-country match has eluded Japan.

Nie and Ma Reach the Finals of the 6th Tong Yang Securities Cup

This year's Tong Yang Securities Cup ended in an all-Chinese final. In the semi-finals, held in Seoul on March 20, 22, and 24, and which consisted of two best-of-three matches, Nie Wieping defeated Japan's Yamashiro Hiroshi 2-1 and Ma Xiaochun defeated Korea's Cho Hun-hyun 2-1.

In the first game of the best-of-five final, played in Seoul on April 27, Ma took advantage of a mistake Nie made in the middle game and forced him to resign. However, two days later, Nie, playing Black, came back to win the second game by 1 1/2 points.

The last three games are scheduled to be played on May 22, 24, and 26.

News from Korea

Lee Chang-ho captures the 12th Great King Title

On February 24, Lee Chang-ho won back the Great King title that he had lost to Cho Hun-hyun last year. In the fourth game of this best-of-five title match, Lee defeated Cho by 1 1/2 points to take the title by a score of 3-1.

Lee Chang-ho defends the 6th Kisei Title

Lee Chang-ho has defended the Korean Kisei title for the second year in a row, defeating Cho Hun-hyun from whom he first captured this title back in 1993. Cho won the sixth game of the title match by 3 1/2 points to even the score to 3-3, but on March 13 Lee won the seventh game, playing White, by 2 1/2 points, defending his title.

Lee Chang-ho Defends the 30th Monarch Title

Lee Chang-ho defeated the challenger Yoo Chang-hyeok 7-dan 3-1 to defend the 30th Monarch title which he took last year from Cho Hun-hyun. The fourth and last game of this best-of-five series was held on March 22, 1995, and Lee, playing White, won by resignation.

News from China

Cao Dayuan wins the 1st Bawang (Monarch) Title

The Bawang title is a new Chinese title inaugurated this year. It is ranked above the Mingren (Meijin) title in prestige and is comparable to the Kisei title in Japan. Bawang means 'supreme monarch'; the characters used are the same as those for the Korean Monarch title. All Chinese professionals from shodan to 9-dan are eligible to compete.

The preliminary rounds are similar in structure to the Japanese Judan tournament. In the first round, players up to 4-dan from four different districts in China vie in a knockout tournament. Sixteen players survive, four from each district, and they join the second-round preliminaries, where they again compete in a knockout tournament with 48 other 5- to 7-dan players. Again, sixteen players survive and join the third round where they are matched

against sixteen 8- and 9-dan players. One more round is played and the sixteen surviving players then play in a double-knockout tournament, in which the losers of the main tournament go into a loser's tournament. The winner of the loser's tournament then plays the winner of the main tournament in a best-of-seven title match.

Cao Dayuan was the winner of the main tournament and Yu Bin defeated both Ma Xiaochun and Nie Weiping to win the losers' tournament, earning him the right to play in the title match which was held from January 4 to February 22, 1995.

Yu Bin (White) won the first game by resig-

nation, but Cao Dayuan (White) came back to even the series by winning the second game, held on January 6, also by resignation. Yu then went on to win the next two games, and it seemed as if he was on the verge of winning the match. However, Cao staged an upset and won the next three games to win the match and take the title.

In the seventh game, Cao made a mistake in the fuseki, but then in the middle game, Yu Bin thought that a large group of his was unconditionally alive. In fact, it could live only by a ko and, because of this miscalculation, Cao was able to stage an upset and win this important Chinese title.

A Message to our Readers

For the last 17 years *Go World* has been published by The Ishi Press Inc. and for the last 8 years distributed by Ishi Press International in North America. However, because of serious differences I have been having with the other directors of Ishi Press International over the last year or so, I have terminated my relations with them and that organization.

From this issue, *Go World* will be published by Kiseido Publishing Company and will be distributed in North America by Kiseido, our office in San Rafael, California. That office is up and running under the management of Bill Franke, and we are now able to satisfy most of your go needs in books and equipment.

Since issue number 71, I have made it a point to have this magazine printed at regular three-month intervals. This issue has come out exactly three months after the previous issue, and it is my intention as both editor and publisher to maintain a strict publication schedule. However, during this transition period, there may be some disruption and/or delay in receiving the issues you paid for.

Since I do not have access to the *Go World* subscriber list, I must ask those who have

made advance payment for issues of this magazine to inform Kiseido of their names and addresses, and from which issue their subscriptions began and how many issues they paid for. Even though Kiseido did not and probably will not receive payment for these subscriptions, I consider it more important that our readers receive the magazines they paid for than financial considerations. Please inform your go friends who may be *Go World* subscribers so that there will be minimal delay in their receipt of this magazine.

I founded Ishi Press in Japan 27 years ago for the purpose of spreading go in the West. In this endeavor I have been very fortunate to have been assisted by both Jim Davies and John Power, who shared my dream of making go as popular in the West as it is in the East. Through Kiseido I intend to carry on the Ishi Press tradition and to continue publishing go books and *Go World* for at least another 27 years.

Richard Bozulich
Editor of *Go World*
President of Kiseido Publishing Company

Determining Life or Death by Breath Patterns

by Ing Chang-ki

'Liberty' or 'breath' is the lifeblood of stones. Stones with breaths are alive; stones without breaths are dead.

The traditional verbal rules determine life or death by the number of eyes. Stones with two eyes are said to be alive, otherwise they are dead. This rule is simple and can easily be understood. Almost everyone agrees that go rules should be as simple as possible. Indeed, verbal rules are for beginners and they should be concise.

The written SST rules define life or death by breath patterns. This rule is of course more difficult to understand than the traditional rule. However, the traditional rule is only a subset of the SST rule, with eyes being the most common of the seven live breath patterns. The other six patterns are also very simple. Written go rules are constituted for use by the referees during the tournaments; they are not for beginners. Therefore, they have to be the most complete rules instead of the simplest. The best written go rules should be able to resolve all situations concerning life and death.


On October 2, 1949, the Nihon Ki-in published *The Laws of Go*. However, this is merely a written form of the verbal rules and cannot be regarded as the real written go rules. The reason is that the verbal rules cannot resolve life-or-death situations involving triple kos, quadruple kos, eternal kos, round-robin kos, etc. Since nobody understood the basic reasons for the causes of the above problems, one could only adjudicate the games in which these situations occurred as 'games with no outcome'. Converting these verbal rules into a written form is a waste of time.

There are two types of breaths. Breaths associated with live stones are real breaths. Breaths associated with dead stones are unreal breaths. Real breaths are breaths that exist permanently in pairs. If a group of stones can maintain two internal breaths, it can never be captured, because each player can make only

one move at a time. Stones that cannot be captured are alive. This is a law that cannot be overturned.


Unreal breaths are breaths that do not exist permanently in pairs. They are either temporary or only appear to be real breaths. Regardless of how many unreal breaths one has, they do not persist. When external unreal breaths are eliminated, they are occupied by stones. One can eliminate these unreal breaths one by one until the stones are breathless and finally captured. Stones that can be captured are dead. This is also a law.

The definition of 'breath' says: spaces adjacent to stones in a life-or-death situation are called breaths. From this, one can see that there are breaths because there are stones; breaths are formed by the shape of the stones. There are three types of stones: a group of stones (*Dia. 1*), a single stone (*Dia. 2*), and ko stones (*Dia. 3*). Different breath patterns are created by different types of stones.




Dia. 1

A group of stones



Dia. 2

A single stone



Dia. 3

The marked stone is a ko stone

A 'group of stones' is two or more stones that cannot be separated. The stones in a group either die together or they live together. Not a single stone can escape by breaking loose. A live group of stones can contain internal real breaths as well as external dames.

A 'single stone' is a detached stone that cannot be linked to other stones. There are no internal breaths associated with a single stone, only external breaths. Therefore, a single stone cannot be alive, unless it is played inside the opponent's group of stones and, by doing so, captures the group. This is the only way a single stone can become a live stone.

A ko shape is formed when two opposing groups are locked together in the 'tiger's mouth' shape. The stones in the ko shape that can be captured repetitively are called ko stones. There are three types of ko stones: single, double, and triple.

The life and death of a group of stones depends solely on its internal breaths. A single stone has only external breaths, but no internal breaths and cannot live. Ko stones consist of both internal and external breaths. However, they must pair up to become real ko breaths. If they do not pair up, they are unreal ko breaths. The breaths associated with a group of stones or ko stones must be paired up in order for them to become real breaths.

We have clarified the definition of two basic types of breaths, namely, 'real breaths' and 'unreal breaths', and three types of stones: 'groups of stones', 'single stone', and 'ko stones'. We will now introduce the five functions of breaths:

1) **Permanent breaths for independent life** — A group with two or more permanent breaths lives independently.

2) **Balancing breaths for coexistence** — When the number of breaths on both sides balance, it is a seki. [In this case, if ko breaths are involved, the number of internal ko breaths (and also the external ko breaths) of the opposing group must be paired up, or they become unreal ko breaths. There is no need to fight the ko between two opposing groups with balanced ko breaths. The side which insists on fighting the ko initiates the cycling of the unreal breaths, and thus disturbs the game. This is known as disturbed life.]

3) **Unreal breaths for non-life** — A group with only unreal breaths is dead. [The breaths associated with a group of stones or ko stones are unreal breaths if they do not pair up. A single stone has only unreal breaths but no permanent breaths or balanced breaths. Cycling the unreal ko breaths also results in a dis-


turbing ko, known as disturbed death.]

4) **Fighting breaths for ko life** — The battle over 'hot stones' determines the life or death of the opposing groups involved. [The stone(s) which can be captured repeatedly in a ko fight which determines life or death is known as 'hot stone(s)'. The side which wins the battle and captures the hot stone(s) lives with his group. On the other hand, the side which loses the battle loses his group.]


5) **Interchangeable breaths for disturbances** — In this situation, the board position repeats after the first cycle of moves and the life-or-death status of all groups is not altered. During the second cycle, every move is a repeat of the moves in the first and results in invariance. Therefore, the SST Rules prohibit the disturbing party from this kind of disturbance at any time beyond the first cycle.

There are eight breath patterns, all constructed by the three types of stones. The following are the breath patterns formed by groups of stones.

1) **Territory breaths** — The enclosed territory has enough room for making two or more real breaths (*Dia. 4*).




Dia. 4




Dia. 5

2) **Eye breaths** — There are two real breaths, A and B in *Dia. 5*. (The two breath patterns above belong to the permanent breaths of a single group.)



Dia. 6




Dia. 7


3) **Shared breaths** — Both sides share the same liberties. Since each liberty is used by both sides, there are two shared breaths at A and B for each side in *Dia. 6*. *Diagram 7* shows a seki

where each side has an eye breath and they share a breath at A. Because the breaths of the opposing groups pair up, it is a seki. (The last two breath patterns belong to the balancing breaths of a seki.)

Breaths associated with a single stone are unreal breaths. The breath associated with an independent ko is a ko breath (*Dia. 8*). Ko breaths can be subdivided into fighting ko breaths and disturbing ko breaths. There are also the single group ko breaths, the string ko breaths, the balanced ko breaths and the unreal ko breaths. The internal ko breaths (and also the external ko breaths) of the opposing groups must pair up in balancing the ko breaths. If not, then they are unreal ko breaths.




group of stones that does not have two real breaths, and the unreal breaths where the ko breaths of the opposing groups do not pair up. In particular, the unreal ko breath shape (*Dia. 11*) and the real ko breath shape (*Dia. 12*) are difficult to distinguish. However, practice makes perfect. If one spends some time studying this, one can certainly master it.



There are two examples where the group of stones and the ko stones combine to form a pattern: 1) Eye Breaths and Ko Breaths (*Dia. 9*), and 2) Shared Breaths and Ko Breaths (*Dia. 10*). In these patterns, the ko breaths of the opposing groups must pair up or they become unreal ko breaths. The unreal breath pattern has the most variety. For example, the unreal breath of a single stone, the unreal breath of a


If one understands how to determine life or death by breath patterns, especially being able to identify between real ko breaths and unreal ko breaths, then one can easily classify a ko as fighting or disturbing. Determining life or death by breath patterns is the prerequisite for classifying a ko as fighting or disturbing. (Translated by Sidney W. K. Yuan)

Three Elementary Problems




Problem 1

Black to play and kill the white stones.



Problem 2

Black to play and live.



Problem 3


Black to kill the five white stones at the top.

(Answers on page 43)


Double Ko Stones and Double Hot Stones

by Yang Yu-Chia


One of the variations in the joseki of the two-space high pincer results in a shape which resembles that of the Eternal Ko. As shown in *Dias. 1 to 4*, the upper left corner results in the repetition of the board position. According to the traditional rules, this is adjudicated as a game with no outcome. Let's see how the Ing rules resolve this life-or-death situation.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Dia. 3




Dia. 4


Diagrams 5 to 7 show the eternal ko shape. It is formed because one side (Black in this example) tries to avoid the five-point nakade eye and extends with 1. His opponent (White), on the other hand tries to prevent Black from living and captures. The board positions are repeated continuously, resulting in a ko fight. According to the Ing Rules, the double ko stones in the eternal ko become double hot stones when they pair up. Thus both sides can fight the ko under equal terms.




Dia. 5




Dia. 6



Dia. 7




Dia. 8



Dia. 9

Diagrams 8 to 10 show examples of how the double ko stones are used as a disturbing ko. When Black captures the single ko stone with 1, White extends to 2 as a ko threat. When Black responds with 3, White captures the single ko stone with White 4 (*Dia. 9*). At this time, extending to 5 is also a ko threat for Black (*Dia. 10*). White is forced to answer at 6. Black recaptures the single ko stone with 7. This results in a disturbing ko which uses the double ko stones as endless ko threats.




Dia. 10

The above two examples serve as references for the two-space high pincer joseki shown in *Diagrams 1 to 4*. The eternal ko fight is a fight for life or death as one side extends and the opponent captures. The double-hot-stone rule is capable of determining its life or death. As for the case of the disturbing ko with double ko stones, both sides repeatedly use the same set of double ko stones as ko threats and it results in invariation. Therefore, beyond the first cycle (of repeated moves), both sides are prohibited from using the double ko stones as ko threats to disturb the game. As one can see, the invariation resulting from the two-space high pincer joseki shown in *Dia. 1* should be resolved by the disturbing ko rule which forbids the disturbing ko from going beyond the first cycle, and not by the double-hot-stone rule. How to distinguish double ko stones from double hot stones is an important lesson in learning the Ing Rules. This is an ex-

ample that should not be overlooked.

Diagram 11 shows a position from a game played between Rin Kaiho and Komatsu Hideki. This is yet another example of a string ko with a single ko using the double-ko stones as ko threats. When Black captures the ko stone with 1, White extends to 2 as a ko threat. When Black captures with 3, White recaptures the ko stone with 4 (*Dia. 12*). Black 5 in *Dia. 13* is also a ko threat. When White responds with 6, Black 7 recaptures the ko stone. Invariation (repetition of board positions) then results by using the double ko stones as ko threats in disturbing the game. Again, the Ing Rules forbid the disturbing ko from going beyond the first cycle. White is not allowed to extend at 2 again as a ko threat. Because of this, Rin (Black) should have won the game by the narrow margin of half a point.

(Translated by Sidney W. K. Yuan)



A New Go Series from Kiseido

Kiseido Publishing Company is preparing a new series of books called *Get Strong at Go*, covering every phase of the game, from the opening to the endgame. Volume 5 of this

series, *Get Strong at Invading*, is now available, and three volumes on joseki from the series are scheduled for publication in autumn 1995.

GET STRONG AT INVADING

Invading is an important technique that every go player should have in his arsenal, and here is a book that will raise your invading ability to expert strength.

The material is presented in problem format. Each problem is part of a series of problems in which various lines are explored. Short sequences of moves allow the reader to concentrate on one particular aspect of a problem without becoming confused through the analysis of complicated variations. This book contains 171 problems and is

divided into three parts: Part One systematically deals with the standard invasions on the side, Part Two with invading the corners and attacking corner enclosures, and Part Three with erasing territorial frameworks.

This is a book for players of all strengths. If you are a weak kyu-player, it is guaranteed to increase your invading ability by as much as six stones. If you already are a strong dan player, it will fill in the gaps that may exist in your invasion technique. This is a book that no serious go player can do without.

Now available. US price: \$10.00 (plus \$1.25 s/h)

GET STRONG AT JOSEKI

Most books on joseki list endless variations, leaving it up to the readers to fend for themselves in applying these josekis in their games. But *Get Strong at Joseki* is a unique work; not only does it list the basic josekis that are most likely to arise in your games, it also shows you which joseki to select and which are the important follow-up moves to play in the middle game.

Each chapter begins with one page showing the main lines of a particular joseki. Three kinds of problems then follow: problems on variants or trick moves; problems on joseki selection; and problems

on playing after the joseki. Each volume contains more than 150 such problems. This problem format is the ideal way to study joseki. Instead of just memorizing variations, your attention is focused on the important moves and concepts of a joseki. Memorization then comes effortlessly, making *Get Strong at Joseki* the perfect joseki books for all players, from 20-kyu to dan level. If you diligently study these three volumes, your feel for joseki will be that of a dan player.

Publication schedule: *Get Strong at Joseki 1* (Aug. 1995), *Get Strong at Joseki 2* (Oct. 1995), *Get Strong at Joseki 3* (Dec. 1995)

Pre-publication US price: \$12.00 each volume (plus \$1.25 s/h)

Other books in the Kiseido *Get Strong at Go Series* scheduled for publication in 1996:

Get Strong at Fuseki

Get Strong at Ko

Get Strong at Handicap Go

Get Strong at the Endgame

Order from:

Kiseido Publishing Company

CPO Box 2126, Tokyo, Japan FAX +81-467-83-4710; e-mail: SGT00076@niftyserve.or.jp

USA: Kiseido, 454 Las Gallinas Ave., #255, San Rafael, CA 94903-3618; Tel: 415-499-1543; e-mail:

kiseido@crl.com VISA and MC accepted. Include number and expiry date with your order.

Europe: Shaak en Gowinkel het Paard, Haarlemmerdijk 147, 1013 KH Amsterdam, Holland;

TEL: +31-20-624-1171; FAX +31-20-627-0885.

The 20th Tengen Title Match

Game Four

For more than 20 years, most of the big seven titles have been held by just a handful of players: Kobayashi Koichi, Cho, Rin, Kato, Otake, and Takemiya. If the era of the hegemony of these players is coming to an end and a new generation is about to take over, Ryu Shikun's triumph in capturing the Tengen title from Rin Kaiho may turn out to be the event that marks the transition from the old generation to the new.

Suddenly, a whole group of young players seems to have emerged to challenge the old guard. The Kisei title match ended in a stunning upset, with the unheralded challenger Kobayashi Satoru taking the title from Cho Chikun. Then, exactly three weeks later, on April 6, 30-year-old Yoda Norimoto took the Judan title from Otake Hideo. Even though Kato has become the challenger for Cho's Honinbo title, he had to rebuff strong challenges by Yo Kagen and Yuki Satoshi.

Because it could be a milestone in the transition from the old generation to the new, *Go World* would like to present the final game of the Tengen title match by which Ryu captured his first title on the day he turned 23. [Auspiciously, Rin was also 23 when he took the Meijin title from Sakata.]

Game Four

White: Ryu Shikun 6-dan

Black: Rin Kaiho Tengen

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 5 hours each

Commentary by Ryu Shikun

I was really happy to have won the Tengen title, especially on December 8, which was my birthday. I thought it would add a touch of drama to win the title on that day.

Rin is a great player. The more I play with him, the more strongly I feel how wonderful his go is. The games in this match reinforced this opinion. Playing a title match with Rin was such an exhilarating experience that I did not think about winning or losing. Perhaps be-

cause of this state of mind I was able to reach a good outcome.





Figure 1 (1-36)

Figure 1 (1-36). *No pressure*


I did not feel at all pressured by the fact that winning this game would bring me the Tengen title. Throughout this series Rin quickly took the lead in the opening. I then had to chase after him and catch up.

I like to make use of thickness for attack. That's why I chose to play the pattern from 6 to 14, making thickness in the bottom left.



Dia. 1

Recently, Black 19 has become a popular move. In response, White has only two options, 20 or White 1 in *Dia. 1*. If White plays 1 there, then Black will cut at 2; Black gets territory and White gets thickness. In this case, however, the ladder is unfavorable for White, so he should not play this variation.



Dia. 2

Instead of 22, Black would be pleased if White played 1 in *Dia. 2*. Black would take territory on the right and the top. This result is not desirable for White.





Figure 2 (37-61)

49: takes ko at 41; 52: takes ko at 46

Figure 2 (37-86). The first turning point

This figure is the first turning point.

I did not expect Black 37. I thought that Black would play A, followed by White B-Black C-White D-Black E-White F.




Dia. 3

If I answered 37 by fighting back with White 1 in *Dia. 3*, Black would prevail over

White after the moves to 10. A result such as this should never happen in a professional game.


I thought a long time about answering 37 with White 40 instead of 38. But White 40 invites Black 46 and, after that, White could not easily attack this black group. It is important to keep in mind that White must not worry about losing this territory; after all, Black can invade the bottom any time he wants.



Dia. 4


White 44. This was a turning point for Black. If Black connected at 1 in *Dia. 4*, his group at the bottom could live, but living with Black 3 and 5 would not be satisfactory. Moreover, if Black answered White 6 with 7, making territory on the right side, White would play the forcing moves of 14 and 16, followed by 18. I think that this is a very good result for White.

Black chose to fight a ko with 45 and 47, but White 50 is such a good ko threat. Usually this move is bad, but in this case, as long as White gets a *ponnuki* with 52 and 54, the outcome is very satisfactory for White.



Dia. 5

If Black had ignored White 50 and took the ko with 1 in *Dia. 5*, White would certainly have played 2. Black could live the corner with 3 and 5, but White 6 would be a great point to play, enabling White to invade at 10. I think this would be good for White.



Dia. 6

Another possibility is Black 3 in *Dia. 6*. Yet, to allow White to take Black's corner group would be too big; the white group on the bottom right could evade a black attack by jumping to White 8.




Figure 3 (62-86)

Figure 3 (62-86). Panic


The result of fight at the bottom was good for White. White built iron-clad thickness and, with this thickness in mind, White 62 and 64 became good attacking moves.

Black 69 prevented White A.

I thought that White had a good position after I played 82. However, when Black played 83, I was unable to see future moves and I started to panic.

In answer to 84, if Black played 1 in *Dia. 7*, White 2 and 4 would be perfect. Black would live, but then White would play 'a' or 'b', and

take a clear lead. After 86, White was faced with his second turning point.



Dia. 7




Figure 4 (87-118)


Figure 4 (87-118). Rin's fearsome strength

When I saw Black 87, my panic reached its peak. I did not consider Black 87 at all, nor did I expect 91. I am ashamed of myself.

The exchange of White 92-Black 93 left some aji there. Without this exchange, no aji would have remained. I was really lucky to find moves to break into Black's right side territory.

Black 101 was aiming not only at the defense of this black group, but also at the cut at A. White 102 was played to prevent that cut. *Dia. 8* shows this. If Black cuts at 1, the moves to Black 15 automatically follow. Then when

Black plays 17 to take away an eye from the white group, his attempt would fail after the tesuji of White 18.



Dia. 8

When Black peeps 111, White must not immediately play 116, but first play 112 and 114; simply connecting with 116 would make Black 111 a great forcing move.




Figure 5 (119-202)


95: takes ko at 87; 98: takes ko at 88; 101: at 87

Figure 5 (119-202). Could I have calmed down?


After the game, Rin said that he regretted playing Black 19 and that this move should have been played at 26. This is a big difference. Had Black played 26, I would have wanted to play White 1 in Dia. 9. One outcome could be Black 2 through White 15. It seems that it would be impossible for Black to live. But the problem is Dia. 10. If Black plays 1 to 5, White would have to kill this black group. But considering Black's move at 'a', forcing White 'b', I was not at all confident I could kill this group.

Yet, if White were to play 1 in Dia. 11, it would still appear to be good for White. After


playing 5, White could prevent Black from invading White's territory in the center. If Black played 2 in Dia. 12, White could respond with 3, 5, 7, and 9. After this, Black could map out territory in the center.




Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

At that time, I was in the middle of *byoyomi* and not able to think carefully; had I encountered Black 26 in the game, fighting spirit might have compelled me to play White 1 in Dia. 9, so I am not sure whether I would have been able to calm down and play White 1 in Dia. 11. After this, Black had no chance, so I won my first title. This is just the beginning for me, and I want to be much, much stronger.

Black resigns after 202 moves.

(Kido, February, 1995. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)

The 19th Kisei Title Match



This year's Kisei title match was one of the most surprising in recent years. Not only did a player who is not in the usual group of top contenders challenge for the title, he also defeated the title holder, Cho Chikun.

Kobayashi Satoru is without doubt among the top players in Japan. He has proven this in the past by challenging Kobayashi Koichi for the Gosei title for three successive years (from 1990 to 1992) and by winning the IBM Open Lightning Go Championship in 1990. He also played in the 1984 Meijin league. However, six months ago no one would have predicted that he would be the new Kisei.

It must be said that Cho did not seem to be in his usual form. He did win the first and third games of this match, but in the second game he made an uncharacteristic blunder and had to resign after only 69 moves. But after the third game he just couldn't seem to get that important third win and Kobayashi took the title by a score of 4-2. It must be mentioned that Cho was winning in the fourth and fifth games, but because of time trouble he made mistakes in the endgames and lost.

If Cho is in a slump, Kobayashi is clearly in the best form he has ever been. In earning the right to challenge Cho for the title, Kobayashi Satoru overcame two formidable opponents.

In the penultimate preliminary round he defeated Kato Masao, who has challenged for the Kisei title himself four times. He then went on to defeat Kobayashi Koichi, the Honorary Kisei, in a best-of-three playoff to determine the challenger. And just a week before capturing the Kisei title, he also won the NHK Cup, a lightning tournament broadcast on nationwide television every Sunday afternoon. For sure, no one can say that his triumph in the Kisei tournament was a fluke.

Since this was Kobayashi's first experience in a best-of-seven match, where the games are played over two days, very few people expected him to win the title. The only question was how good a showing he would make. Even Kobayashi didn't seem to think too much of his chances. Right after he beat Kobayashi Koichi to become the challenger, he said: 'I have no confidence that I can defeat Cho, but I will play as hard as I can and try to make a good showing. I think I still have the potential to improve and I would be disappointed if I lost four straight games, because it would show that I wasn't making progress.' By snatching the Kisei title from Cho, Kobayashi has jumped from being one of many promising 9-dans to the number one player in Japanese go. That's amazing progress.

Game One

White: Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun Kisei, Honinbo, Oza

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 8 hours each

Played on January 18-19, 1995, at the Hotel Nikko Atlanta in Atlanta, Georgia.

Commentary by Otake Hideo 9-dan





Figure 1 (1-23)

Figure 1 (1-23). *Avoiding a moyo game*


The opening game of this match was held in Atlanta, Georgia. This city is one of the most active in the United States because the Olympics are to be held there next year.

The first two moves were played very quickly. The colors for the first game are always decided by *nigiri*, so most likely the players prepared their opening strategies for both Black and White. Recently, Satoru often plays on the star points whether he has Black or White, but Cho is not as predictable.

Currently, against an approach move such as Black 7, Satoru likes playing the one-space pincer of 8. Of course, White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1* is another way of playing, but Black is always one step ahead of White, so White must eventually think about erasing Black's moyo. By playing White 8 in the game, the spheres of influence of each player's groups are dispersed. Therefore, White does not have to pay attention to Black's growing moyo. However, in this non-moyo style there are other things to worry about.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2

With White 18, it is Cho's turn to decide the direction of the game, and he played 19 to 23. The alternative would be making a one-space corner enclosure with 1 in *Dia. 2*. Nobody can say which is better. The difference is that in *Dia. 2*, White can invade at 'a' or probe by attaching at 'b'. In *Dia. 3*, these two moves are no longer possible, but the two marked stones gives White thickness on the outside. This thickness should give White some advantage. As you can see, both the moves in *Dia. 2* and the moves in the game have their merits and demerits.



Dia. 3





Figure 2 (24-30)

Figure 2 (24-30). Satoru's bold new strategy

White 24 is the big strategic decision. White would never think of playing an approach move at A because the space on the right is too narrow for White and the subsequent development would be severe on him. He has to consider how to utilize the thickness at the bottom and the thickness at the top left. So after exchanging 24 for 25, White plays at 26 to strengthen his position at the bottom. This is a bold new strategy he is trying out for his first big title match. I liked this move and I think he got a good result by playing it.


Instead of 24, is there any other way to play or grand plan?

What about approaching with the knight move in *Dia. 4*? This would be a commonsense move. If Black plays 'a' against White 3, White would play at 'b'. But recently, Black has been playing at 4. After White responds, Black would aim to play at 'c' instead of 'a'.




Dia. 4

Usually Satoru would have played 1 and 3 in *Dia. 5*. This is also a wonderful way of playing, but Black would play 'a' or 'c' (aiming at 'b') and not let White make territory at the top. For that reason, White is afraid that 3 would lose its effect.



Dia. 5

Instead of 26, the two-space jump of White 1 in *Dia. 6* is also a good move. Nobody could find fault with it. The reason is that the marked black stone is protruding out in a low position, so a black approach move at 'a' would not bother White.



Dia. 6

However, the same problems as described in *Dia. 5* still exist, so to play a move like this, White would have to be courageous.

An invasion at 'b' is also possible. Moreover, an approach at 'c' is also conceivable. Satoru's new idea was to play in the lower left and let Black invade with 27, then start a fight with 28 and 30.




Figure 3 (30-45)

Figure 3 (30-45). White has good shape.

By playing 26 in the lower left corner, White A becomes a big move. White also aims to attack at B. Moreover, the marked white stone will also participate in the fight that starts with Black 31.


The moves from 31 on are as White expected. Against 30, there is no other response except attaching at Black 31.

Against Black 35, if White hanes at 37, Black C becomes a perfect move. Satoru preempted this by preparing to make sabaki with 36. If Black immediately answers 36 with 39, White would be able to play 37 without any fear. Therefore, it was natural for Cho to extend to 37.

Some readers might wonder why Black didn't play a geta at 1 in *Dia. 7* with 39. The reason is that the atari at White 2 would be painful. Of course, the top right corner would not all fall into White hands, but still . . . it would be painful.


Needless to say, Black 1 makes a nice thickness in the center, but the marked white stone is already in place and that decreases the value of this thickness. That's why Cho did not take the two white stones with Black 1.

After Black 39, White moves out with 40. Cho then spent two hours thinking about 41. It was a patient move and he played it after reading out all the variations.




Dia. 7

Besides 41, there were other severe moves; for example, the hane at 1 in *Dia. 8* followed by the cut at 3. After making sabaki by playing at 'a', White would push through and cut with 4, 6, and 8. This is very severe. Even though Black has solidified his area on the right side, White's moyo at the bottom and center is magnificent. White has no complaint.



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

If Black plays 1 in *Dia. 9*, White makes sabaki with 2 to 6. In both *Dia. 8* and *9*, the three black stones at the center top might become a burden. For these reasons, Black gave up on these strong attacking variations.

White's diagonal connection at 42 let Black link up with 45, but I think White is left with good shape.





Figure 4 (46-63)

Figure 4 (46-63). *The eighth wonder of the world*

After the game I heard that Satoru regretted playing 52. Why didn't he push one more time with 1 in *Dia. 10*, then play 3? This is a mystery comparable to the seven wonders of the world. The exchange of 1 for 2 creates two defects in Black's shape: one at 'a' and another at 'b'. In the game, by playing 53 Black settles his shape with one move.




Dia. 10

Satoru: 'When Cho pressed with 53, I realized I had been absent-minded.'

The moves from 54 on are not typical of Satoru's play. His mood seems to have


changed. Although the moves to 62 guarantee that White will capture two stones, White's key stone at 54 at the top has been captured.



Dia. 11


14: takes ko

Instead of 56, playing 1 in *Dia. 11* is premature. Black starts a ko with 14, and even if White captures three stones with the ko threat of 15 followed by 17, it is not enough compensation for the loss of the territory at the top.



Dia. 12

However, before playing 54, playing White 1 in *Dia. 12* might be possible. If Black responds with 2, White breaks through the top area with 3 to 11. In this position, White 'a' becomes a good attacking move. If Black 8 at 11, White double ataris at 10. This is the same as Black playing 61 at 62 in the figure.



Dia. 13

5: takes ko

Instead of Black 6, if he plays 1 in *Dia. 13*, the ko threat of 6 and 8 is enough for White. If these variation are valid, White can probe at 60 with 52.





Figure 5 (64-78)

Figure 5 (64-78). When losing, play slowly.

From here the game gradually shifted in Black's favor. Satoru knew that the moves in Figure 4 were bad, but he was caught up in the heat of battle and he couldn't stop himself. There is an adage which says, 'When losing, play slowly.' Satoru should have followed this piece of wisdom.




Dia. 14

The connection of 64 is indispensable. Then by attaching and descending with 65 and 67 Cho sealed the fate of the lone white stone to the right. At the same time he makes *miai* with A and 69.


White 68 is big. If this move is omitted,

Black will play 1 in Dia. 14. Now White would be forced to play 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c'—Black 'd' to make eyes. What's more, the connection of 4 in Dia. 14 is a heavy and overconcentrated move that cannot be borne.



Dia. 15 8: connects

On the other hand, by playing 68 White is promised the endgame moves of 1 to 7 in Dia. 15. After Black connects at 8, White 'a' is big. If White omits 'a', then he can consider the moves in this diagram as *kikashi*. These moves make White thick, so he can now invade at least as deeply as the attachment of 'b'. The difference between Dia. 15 and Dia. 14 is huge.



Dia. 16

It is natural for Black to cut with 69. White 70 was Satoru's sealed move. It was a very simple and straightforward move. Locally, 70 is

the correct move, but White is losing, so it is better for him to play 1 in *Dia. 16*. Against 2, it is possible to make sabaki with 3 to 9. Alternatively, Black might play at 'a' instead of 2, but Black would then become 'busy', with a lot of things hanging. However, after attaching it is hard to say if the result is good for White.




Figure 6 (79-109)

Figure 6 (79-109). The finishing touches

Satoru's fighting spirit is quickly subsiding because of the fighting at the top right. On the contrary, Cho's is marching straight ahead for victory with his steady moves.


Black 83 takes away White's eye shape at the top. Black need not fear the cut of White 1 in *Dia. 17* as long as the white group at the top is threatened.

Black 2 and 4 are the normal moves. Black 4 is attacking both the left and the right. Black's only worry is how to deal with the white moyo at the bottom. But as long as White has weak stones at the top, Black cannot expect a good result. It is very painful for White to have to play 84. He would rather have cut with this move, but the cut automatically disappears when Black plays 85 and 87. These moves were possible because of Black's big move at 83.

White fights back with 88, but Cho turns at 89 and continues to attack the center white group.

Against 90, Black 93 is the vital point, since it snatches away all of White's eye shape.


Black 99 is sente, but White decides to abandon the stones at the top.



Dia. 17

You should understand that after Black 95, White 96 and 98 cannot be omitted. The reason is that Black is threatening to play A through E and cut off all the White stones in the center.

Against 99, White cuts at 100, abandoning the tail of his group. But the tail is very long.



Dia. 18

White can save his tail by playing 1 in *Dia. 18*. White lives with 3 and 5 (or 'a'), but Black might play 2 at 'b', then go after the whole white group by making it eyeless with 3.

If White played F instead of 108, Black would play G (the same move as 'b' in *Dia. 18*) and, if the black stones at 95 and 97 escape, the white group at the top would die.




Figure 7 (110-159)
44: takes four stones at 24

Figure 7 (110-159). Satoru goes down fighting.

White 12. The game is lost for Satoru, but he must go down fighting. Therefore, he plays White 12. If Cho makes a mistake, it could be an upset, but Cho's play is very steady and safe; he is ahead by at least 10 points.

Against Black 53, White plays 54 to 58, setting the scene for his resignation. After 59, if White cuts at A, Black B-White C-Black D, and Black can capture one or two white stones.

In this game, Satoru's fuseki was very ambitious, befitting a young challenger. In Figure 2, White 24 and 26 was a new idea, and it was rather successful.

However, after Cho spent two hours thinking about Black 41, Satoru suddenly lost his composure. I wonder how Satoru spent his time while Cho was thinking for two hours. I suspect that he could have used those two hours better than he did.

White resigns after Black 159.

(Kido, March 1995. Translated by Yoshikawa Takeshiro.)

Game Two

White: Cho Chikun Kisei, Honinbo, Oza

Black: Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan

komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 8 hours each

Played on February 1-2, 1995, at the Hotel New Otani Hakata in Fukuoka Prefecture.




Figure 1 (1-69)

Figure 1 (1-69). Cho resigns on the first day.

After Cho had won the first game, his loss in this game was stunning. In the first game, Satoru's play lacked vigor, so he was determined to fight hard in this game.

Both sides started by playing on the star point in each corner.

After the approach move of 5, the sequence from White 6 to Black 15 has been in fashion recently. Cho thought for 7 minutes before playing White 16, and after 22 minutes of thought, Kobayashi played the pincer at 17.

In the pressroom, the professionals who were watching commented that if Cho invaded at the 3-3 point, the position would be symmetrical. Disliking such symmetry, Cho attached at 18. The game continued calmly up to Black 33, at which time the game adjourned for the lunch break.

When the game resumed after lunch, Cho pushed and cut with 40 and 42. However, when he invaded at 50, the downward trend in his game began. Satoru thought for only a moment before playing 51. Cho in his usual way started grumbling to himself. The sequence up to 57 was inevitable, so no time was spent over these moves.


Otake: 'If White's invasion fails, the game will be over quickly.'

Instead of 58, White must play 1 to 5 in the Reference Diagram, even if his stones in the corner are not completely alive. When



After a short post-mortem analysis, nearly everybody has left the playing room, but Cho can't seem get up and remains staring at the go board in disbelief.

Kobayashi attached at 65, Cho cried out, 'What did I do; it's over.' After a few perfunctory moves, he resigned.



Reference Diagram

The television cameraman and a reporter rushed into the playing room. There, they saw Cho sitting immobile, staring at the board, his face a bright red. The atmosphere in the room was so heavy that Kobayashi was afraid to say even one word. This was the first time a Kisei title-match game had ended on the first day.

White resigns after Black 69.

(Kido, March 1995. Translated by Yoshikawa Takeshiro.)

Game Three

White: Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun Kisei, Honinbo, Oza

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 8 hours each

Played on February 8-9, 1995.

The monthly Nihon Ki-in magazine, *Kido*, asked three promising young players, Morita Michihiro 7-dan, Yo Kagen 7-dan, and Mimura Tomoyasu 7-dan, to come together and comment on the third game of this title match.

Kido: I had asked Morita Michihiro 7-dan to join this discussion, but he had the flu, so Komatsu Hideki 8-dan has taken his place instead.

Komatsu: Morita is a specialist on Cho, so it is a big burden for me to take his place.

Kido: It is certainly too bad he couldn't be here.

Figure 1 (1-25). Strong players play strange moves.

Mimura: Should I play out the game on the board? This was a hard game for me to understand. Let's start with White 24.

Komatsu: This was a strange fuseki. In the opinion of Yonenaga, the shogi champion, strong players like to play strange moves.





Figure 1 (1-25)

Kido: Kobayashi spent 20 minutes thinking about White 24, and Cho spent almost two hours on Black 25.


Yo: Before playing 24, if it were possible, pressing at A might have been a good move.



Dia. 1

Mimura: If White 1 in Dia. 1, there might have been a big swap. Black would play 2, and after the moves to 12, White would play 13. This could become a difficult game for White.

Yo: In response to White 1, how about crawling twice with 2 and 4? If White follows with 5, Black 2 and 4 could be looked on as kikashi. Now Black comes back and hane with 6.



Dia. 2

Komatsu: It would take a lot of courage to cut at 10, so he jumps to 7 instead. That's my opinion, but I don't really understand the position. However, when Black plays 12 in Dia. 2, it's a big blow to White. In any case, Black will hane at 6.

Mimura: It takes a lot of nerve to play like this at the beginning of the game.

Kido: What about Black 25? In the hour and fifty minutes that Cho thought about this move, he must have considered quite a few variations.





Figure 2 (25-50)

Figure 2 (25-50). The consensus on this new move.


Komatsu: Mr. Yo, you recommended that Black should attach and extend?



Dia. 3


Yo: Yes. If Dia. 3 results, Black can then switch to A giving him a good game.

Mimura: I remember once seeing the shoulder hit at 1 in Dia. 4 in an old game. If White 4 at 'a', Black will play at 7 and a fight results.



Dia. 4

Komatsu: Why did Cho choose Black 25 even though there were good moves such as in *Dia. 3* and 4? Black 25 has to be a loose move. By the way, isn't it more natural for White to play for a ko with 1 in *Dia. 5* instead of 32?




Dia. 5 4: connects the ko

Yo: Yes, but after the ko threat of 3, Black will connect at 4 and, after White 5, Black will play 6.

Komatsu: That's true. Black would certainly not be unhappy with this result.

Kido: The moves in the game were straightforward. What would happen, however, if White cut at 1 in *Dia. 6* instead of 36?




Dia. 6

Komatsu: Black would capture at 2. Some people were of the opinion that Black should atari at 9, instead of jumping to 8, then keep pressing, sacrificing the marked stone. But I wouldn't sacrifice it.

Mimura: With Black 8 and 10 White is not very happy. That's why he cut on top with 36 instead of 1 in *Dia. 6*.

Yo: Settling the shape with 42 to 46 then expanding with 50 is just like Satoru. But didn't he have a move with which to pressure Black at the top? What about White 1 and the following in *Dia. 7*?




Mimura: At this point, which side do you think is better?

Yo: A lot of players would choose White?

Komatsu: I prefer Black, but at the Nihon Ki-in, everybody preferred White. However, the great Cho has read out this position, so it certainly can't be bad for Black.

Kido: Instead of White 50, is there anything else?


Yo: What about attacking the top with 1 in *Dia. 8*? However, White can't get much profit by attacking Black here, and Black 4 is too big.



Dia. 8

Mimura: Immediately after Cho played 57, he regretted it. He suggested invading at A.

Komatsu: This is not the kind of move Cho usually plays, but he was aiming to attack the white stones at the top starting with Black B.



Dia. 9

Dia. 10

Mimura: What about the invasion? For example, Black 1 to 15 in *Dia. 9*. Each side invades the other and the game becomes close.

Komatsu: I don't agree. Black 1 should be a sacrifice stone. Black makes a moyo in the center with 5 and 7 in *Dia. 10*.

Mimura: If such a severe move were possible, the game would be over immediately.

Yo: Whatever the case, I agree that the invasion at A should be played.

Komatsu: I think the reason that many players prefer White's position is that they are not aware how severe an invasion at A is.

Yo: White invades at 60. If he extended to C, for sure Black would have attacked at A.

Mimura: After the forcing moves of 62 to 66, White has no follow-up. Therefore, White played 68. The moves to White 74 were inevitable. Locally, Black is good, but there was no other way for White.




Figure 4 (77-109)


Figure 4 (77-109). Hard to evaluate

Kido: This was a strange game. Both players thought that Black was good, but the people watching in the anteroom as well as the people in Tokyo thought White was better. Cho said that the those at the side of the board calculate more accurately than those remote from the scene.

Komatsu: The opinion of those in the anteroom is not reliable. That includes me. The truth is to be found in the opinion of the players. The game is close and well-balanced. For sure, White is not behind.

Yo: By playing 77, the balance of territory is maintained.


Mimura: Was Satoru convinced that 86 was a sente move? Why was he in such a hurry to make this move? Ordinarily, it would be sente, but here Black 87 is natural. What if White had extended to 1 in *Dia. 11*?



Dia. 11

Kido: Kobayashi seems to have overlooked a simple move.

Mimura: He thought that he could escape with 1 in *Dia. 12*, but Black 2 and 4 stop him in his tracks. Satoru thought that Black would play 2 at 3, then White could atari at 'a'. For some reason he didn't see Black 2.



Dia. 12

Komatsu: Up to 96, both sides are in a fierce struggle, but then with 97, Black invades.


Kido: Black still doesn't defend at A.

Yo: Yes. Black 97 shows a lot of fighting spirit.

Komatsu: Cho played at 103 without connecting at 104. He was really aiming to kill the white stones at the bottom. Let's look at what happens when Black connects.

Mimura: One of the variations studied is *Dia. 13*. White 8 must be played from the outside. This gives White sente. He can then gouge out Black's base at the top with 14. But

the result in this diagram is not very good for White.



Dia. 13

Komatsu: I agree. Black is 10 points ahead on the board. Why didn't Cho connect at 1? He must have been eager to attack the White group at the bottom.

Yo: White 84 and 86 were the problem moves. Even though they were heavy, Satoru liked them.





Figure 5 (110-158)

Figure 5 (110-158).

Komatsu: Since Satoru cut from the inside with 10, he must have thought that the sequence would end in sente for him. The moves to 22 were big, but Cho did not defend. Instead, he connected on the left with 13.

Yo: White should have simply exchanged 1 for 2 in *Dia. 14*, then cut at 3.



Dia. 14

(From the position in *Dia. 14*, the game was played out to the end.)


Mimura: Black has 70 points and White has slightly better than 60 points. In the actual game I cannot tell which side is better. In any case, the moves up to 22 result in a big gain for White.

Komatsu: When White cut inside at 10, an unexpectedly large number of variations became possible. Black 27 is not really sente, but Cho felt that this move was necessary.

Kido: Would it have been bad for White to have defended against 27?

Yo: I don't know. But White 32 and 34 were big. Both sides are full of fighting spirit.

Komatsu: Mr. Mimura, up to 45, do you have an alternative way for White to play?




Dia. 15

Mimura: Yes. Playing 1 in *Dia. 15* instead of White 40. In this diagram, White is 2 1/2 points better. That might have been enough to win.

Kido: Instead of 2, why not play at 3?

Mimura: White 'b'—Black 'c'—White 'a' is terrible for Black. Therefore, in *Dia. 16* the result of the game will be decided by White's success or failure in living with his group in the middle of the board.



Dia. 16

Yo: Yes, if White lives, the game is over.

(Many variations were then played out, but no way for White to live was found, so this diagram was considered too dangerous for White to play.)

Komatsu: Well, I guess 40 and 42 were the correct moves after all, and *Dia. 15* is not possible. Getting two points is nice, but it is too dangerous.

Kido: The moves from 46 were a success for White.

Yo: After White 58, A and B are miai, but A is a bit bigger than B.

Mimura: Before 46, White should have played at C. In the actual game C is played by Black as reverse sente.

Figure 6 (159–199). *Big stones never die?*

Kido: The last part of this game was quite dramatic.

Komatsu: Satoru thought that 62 was sente, but Cho ignored it and fiercely attacked with 63. Cho captured the whole group. Astounding, wasn't it?

Yo: Didn't Cho make a mistake in this attack? Instead of 67, he should have played 1 and 3 in *Dia. 17*. This would completely destroy any chance White might have.

Mimura: That's true. White 68 was the losing move. If White played the moves from 1 in *Dia. 18*, he would have lived.

Yo: After White 7, if Black 'a', White 'b'—Black 'c'—White 'd'; if Black 'e', White 'a'—Black 'f'—White 'g' and White escapes.





Figure 6 (159-199)

Kido: It is strange that Cho attacked even when he was slightly ahead.



Dia. 17

Komatsu: Remember, the game was in *byoyomi*. Also, most players would have connected at 64 against White 62. This has nothing to do with Cho's judgment. If he feels he can capture, he will do it. Both players missed Dia. 17, but their fighting was tremendous.

White resigns after Black 199.

(Kido, April 1995. Translated by Yoshikawa Takashiro.)


Game Four

White: Cho Chikun Kisei, Honinbo, Oza

Black: Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 8 hours each

Played on February 22-23, 1995, in Hiroshima.



Dia. 18

The fourth game was filled with unbelievable fighting, but both sides made several mistakes. For that reason, it cannot be called a masterpiece. Still, the excitement it generated should entertain the reader.




Figure 1 (1-32)

Figure 1 (1-32). Challenging each other with their fighting spirits

Long ago, Kobayashi was quite fond of the formation of Black 1-3-5.

Instead of 7, Black 9 is more popular, but Kobayashi wanted to develop quickly by establishing a presence on the left with 7.

Against White 8, he answered deliberately with 9, coming out of the joseki with sente. He then made a two-space extension to 15.

Some players might prefer to attack White 8 more severely, but since Kobayashi is trying to develop quickly, the move he made is more natural. From this point on, there were several interesting moves. Both players were challenging each other with their fighting spirits.

From 16 to 21, neither side answered the other's moves. Each player seems to be playing according to his own intention. However, all these moves were natural and there was nothing strange about them.

Black could also play at 23 with 21. In that case, White would play A, Black B, White C. However, Kobayashi didn't like this sequence.

Kobayashi: In order to utilize the stones at 7, 15, and 19, I wanted to attack the white stones in the lower left corner. There is no other way to do this except to play 21.

Up to Black 29, both players played the correct order of moves.

Later, Black can peep at B and D. This result is exactly as Black had planned. After thinking for a long time, White patiently played 32, defending against one of Black's peeps.




Figure 2 (32-100)

Figure 2 (32-100). Kobayashi struggles to catch up.

If Black had lost the game, Black 35 and 37 would have been called the losing moves. As Kiyonari 9-dan explained, these moves feel good, but White gets a big territory with 36 and 40. A simple extension to A would have been sufficient. If Black A, White would

answer at 52. Jumping out at 100 with 35 would have made for an interesting game.

Unwillingly, Kobayashi had to change the direction of his game by attaching at 41. Black 43 was another mistake.


Kobayashi: Black 43 was a stupid mistake. There is no other way except to connect at 48.

At this point, White had taken the lead.

After White 54, Black's stones are in a state of disarray while White's formation at the top is thick. The area Black has gained on the right is not as good as the area White has gained at the top.

However, White also missed a move that would have decided the game.

Cho: White 58 should have been played at 65. This would leave behind the attachment at 75. But I didn't have the confidence to play this move.



Dia. 1


In the discussion after the game, Dia. 1 was shown. Assuming the strongest play by Black, the result is ko. If White were to lose this ko, the damage would be very large. Originally, this territory belonged to Black, so it would be enough to make ko threats against the black group in the bottom left corner.

Black was behind, but he doggedly chased after White and eventually caught up.

Black succeeded in both invading and defending his outside territory from 59 to 65.

Black 67 was good judgment. He gave up his stones at the top, but with 73 and 77, he took his final chance to make a huge territory in the center of the board.

Cho: I should have attached at 1 in *Dia. 2* with White 66. The moves to White 9 are one of many variations that could occur, but this move would be quite severe on Black.



Dia. 2

The idea of sacrificing 61 and 63 shows Kobayashi's high-level of play. Still, White is leading by a little.

After fixing the shape on the bottom right with the moves from 78, White played 94. Cho regretted this move. The hane at B was a very big move, and he should have played there instead.





Figure 3 (101-143)

Figure 3 (101-143). Three mistakes


At the last stage of the game there were three serious mistakes.

The first mistake was at 1. This move should have been at 3. In this case, Black has a big endgame sequence from 1 to 7 in *Dia. 3*. The connection at 'a' then promises another big endgame move at 'b'.




Dia. 3

The second mistake was that Cho did not realize that 7 was actually a ladder. When Black played 7, White should have played a ladder break at E. If Black 2 in *Dia. 4*, White draws back with 3. At this point Black would defend at 'a' and White would connect at 'b'; White has a won game.



Dia. 4

The third mistake was White 16. After this mistake, the game was lost for White. It is clear from *Dia. 5* that there is no hope of White escaping. White gets squeezed in the sequence to Black 6; then after Black connects at 8, the nine white stones in the center are dead.



Dia. 5 7: connects




Figure 4 (144-210)

Figure 4 (144-210)

Black wins by 3 1/2 points.

(Commentaries taken from *Shukan Go*, March 7, 1995, and *Kido*, April 1995. Translated by Yoshikawa Takeshiro.)

Game Five

White: Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun Kisei, Honinbo, Oza

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 8 hours each

Played on March 1-2, 1995

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru

Figure 1 (1-23). It looked good, but it was bad.

When Cho played 7, I realized that the game would not be easy for me. Some people

would say that 7 was natural, but I didn't expect it. I expected the development in *Dia. 1*. My intention was to play in the style of Go Seigen with 2 and 4, developing quickly.





Figure 1 (1-23)




Dia. 1

With the black corner enclosure 1 and 5 in the top right, White's wall with 6 to 10 cannot be praised. Even an amateur would realize that Black's position is better.

At this point I made up my mind to play a bad move. No other move can be worse than White 18. If you asked me why I played that way, I would be at a loss to explain. The best I can say is that I wanted to see how Cho would refute it.

White 1 in *Dia. 2* is the move that first comes to mind. Instead of 3, White could also

play at 'a'. In both cases, White would lose the game by 7 points. But by playing 18, the game would be lost by 10 points. That is how much worse White 18 is. By jumping out with 19 to 21, Black has separated White into two groups. White's stones are in tatters. With two groups to defend, White will be too busy patching up his position to make any profit.



Dia. 2

Figure 2 (24-50). When you play a bad move, you end up with a bad position.

White 18 was the most memorable move I made in this series. I loved that move.





Figure 2 (24-50)


Cho regretted playing Black 25. He showed White 1 in Dia. 3 as an alternative. However, by playing kosumi with 2, in my opinion the

result is about the same as in the game. In any case, from 26 to 31, White has no complaint.



Dia. 3

By flattening out White's stones with the peeps of 33 and 35, the game was proceeding at Black's pace. Before 33 and 35, I could have peeped myself at A and prevented Black's peeps, but playing such a simple peep is against my nature.



Dia. 4

Black 37 was a skillful probe, but White 38 was a very bad move. In order to put pressure on the black stones at the bottom, White should have played 1 in Dia. 4. I was afraid that Black would lean on White with 2, but White 3 would have been a good response.

The approach move of Black 39 on the wide side is the only move.

Against 39 I attacked the two black stones with 40. Even though the pressure is slight, it is still a good move. This is why White 1 in Dia. 4 would have been a good move.

With the invasion from 41 to 49, the balance of territory was destroyed. This game is a wonderful example of bad moves. I should

have been given a handicap instead of having had the privilege of playing on even terms with Cho.





Figure 3 (51-77)

Figure 3 (51-77). A smooth flow

If White had played the marked stone in Dia. 5, an attachment at A would have been a strong move. The sequence to White 9 in Dia. 5 would result. Because White 'a' is sente against the black group in the corner, White must play 6 and 8. Therefore, White can play the ladder with 9.



Dia. 5

Black 59 defends against A. However, Black should have played 59 at 60, forcing White to respond at 76. But this is not such an important problem. In this figure, Black's moves flow smoothly.

Black 61 induces White 62. After that, the hane and connection of 63 and 65 is a nice sequence. Someone recommended Black 61 at B, but I can't agree.

White 66 attacks the black group at the top. Black defends by playing forcing moves with

67 to 73, followed by the attachment of Black 75. This was a well-timed sequence. Black now plays 77, making good shape and holding on to the lead. Only a miracle could save me now.

At this point, Cho entered *byoyomi*.





Figure 4 (78-101)

93: takes ko at 85; 96: takes ko at 86

Figure 4 (78-101). An unbelievable move

I played White 78 and 80, trying to kill the black group on the left. These were desperate moves, made in an effort to catch up. But such an attack is not enough to upset the balance of the game.



Dia. 6

Then Cho played 101, an unbelievable move. The devil must have been talking to him. According to Cho, he should have played

1 in *Dia.* 6. After White 10, he would have ended up 10 points ahead on the board. Moreover, White's group on the left doesn't look like it can live, but if White defended at 'a' instead of playing 10, White would be even further behind.




Figure 5 (101-150)

Figure 5 (101-150), Figure 6 (151-204). *I need more discipline.*

Black 1 and 3 were too slow to make profit. When White played 4 to 10 in sente, the flow of the game changed in White's favor. The deciding move was 20. Using this move to harass Black, White makes profit with 22 and 24. Suddenly, White has staged an upset.




Figure 6 (151-204)

In this game, I was saved by a mistake Cho made when he was in time trouble. My impression is only that I won. If I continue to play such bad moves in next year's title match, I will be defeated no matter who the challenger might be. I therefore have to become more disciplined. Otherwise, I will leave a black mark on the Kisei title.

Black resigns after White 204.

(Kido May, 1995. Translated by Yoshikawa Takeshiro.)

Game Six

White: Cho Chikun Kisei, Honinbo, Oza

Black: Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 8 hours each

Played on March 15-16 in Hokkaido.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru.

Figure 1 (1-18). *I only looked at the go board*

The day before this game, Cho said that he would play the first 50 moves in 30 minutes. Cho admitted that he failed to manage his time well in the previous two games. Indeed, when the game started I was astonished at the high-speed pace of his game. I felt that I had pushed him to the edge of the ring. If he had used a lot of time in the opening stage, I would have felt under pressure.





Figure 1 (1-18)

With one more win I would become Kisei. This prospect made me a bit nervous. Just like Yamashiro when he was one win away from capturing Cho's Honinbo title, I felt that I

didn't deserve to become Kisei. Knowing that such negative thoughts would affect my game, I tried to concentrate only on the go board. In this way, I was able to play calmly.



Dia. 1

Several other moves are possible instead of White 10. One of these variations is the two-space extension of White 1 in Dia. 1. This would most likely lead to Black 2 to 6.

I once played the moves 7 to 10 in another game. In that game, the black stone in the lower right corner was on the 3-4 point. Ryu Shikun noticed this after the game was over. That game was played more than 10 years ago in the Meijin league against Otake. At that time, Ryu had not yet arrived in Japan from Korea. Now I understand why Ryu is so strong. He must have studied a lot of games.

Against White 10, up to 15 are the expected moves. I thought that 16 was the only answer, but one of the observers watching the game criticized this move and suggested White A-Black B-White C or D. I can't agree, however. If Black can play B, the left half will be balanced, so the right half of the board will be Black's lead. Cho would never play such a lukewarm move.

Black 17 gently confines White to the left side. White 18 is now absolutely necessary.

Figure 2 (19-41). Everything I expected

I was looking for a new variation when I attached with 19 and 21. If Black 21 at 1 in Dia. 2, the moves to 7 (or 'a') would follow, and White would play 8 on the right. I didn't like





Figure 2 (19-41)

this result. However, if I made a *sanrensei* with 7 on the right side, White would play 'b', and all Black's stones would become thin.




Dia. 2


Against Black 21, the moves beginning with 22 give an equal result. To avoid the peep, Black would have to play 25 at A in the figure. Which is better, I can't say.

White 30 and 32 is just what I expected. Someone said that White should have play moves lighter than 30 and 32, but 30 and 32 are the only way.

If White 1 in Dia. 3, Black 2 is troublesome. If White 1 in Dia. 4, Black 2 is right on the point. White 'a' is too slow even though there is no immediate black attacking move.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

With 32, if White jumps out two spaces with 1 in *Dia. 5*, White's shape after Black 2 is not complete. If White 1 in *Dia. 6*, Black strikes at 2, which again is right on the point. Even though these moves are what I expected, it doesn't mean that the game is favorable for Black.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Expanding from the inside with 36 is just the kind of severe move Cho likes to make.

Figure 3 (42–57). *Is the game going to end on the first day again?*

White spent more than one hour on 48. I was surprised because he said that he was

going to spend only 30 minutes on the first 50 moves. He broke the promise he had made to himself.





Figure 3 (42–57)


Black 51 was one of the important moves of the game. I was aiming to play here from early on, but Cho clearly was not expecting it. After I made this move he started grumbling to himself, 'The game is going to be over again in one day.' Cho is usually overly pessimistic. However, 51 reveals one of the blind spots of his thinking.

However, I'm not sure that the timing in playing 51 was correct. For example, if Black plays 1 in *Dia. 7*, without having exchanged 49 and 50 in the figure, White ends in gote.



Dia. 7

In addition, before Black played 51, it would have been possible for White to fix the black territory by playing 1 to 3 in *Dia. 8*. In the game, however, White would have to link up with 5 and 7, and this would be unbearable for him.



After long thought White 54 became the sealed move. Cho could have pushed and cut with White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 9*, but it wouldn't make much difference for Black whether he won the ko here or took profit elsewhere with a ko threat.

The fact that White has to play 54 and can't play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 9*, is tough on him. Black's penetration of White's territory when he connects with 57 is a great success for Black. I didn't expect such an easy success because my opponent was Cho.

Figure 4 (58–84). Nobody praised my move.

I was confused as to whether playing 63 or 64 was better. If Black plays 64, the peep of White A, followed by Black 63, would be the correct order of moves.

After Black 63, if White defends at 65, Black would play 64–White A–Black B. This would be not be bad for Black.

White 64 is full of fighting spirit. After that there is no other way except the moves up to Black 71. White attacks the central black stones with 72 and 74. This was another important move of the game.

I was proud of Black 75, which fixed the shape of the black stones on the left. But




Figure 4 (58–84)

nobody praised this move, so I have to praise it myself. This was the best move of the game.

White can't resist. If White plays 80 at C, Black would start a ko with D. This ko fight would be favorable for Black. Black steals White's eye shape with the moves to 84, while making an eye for his own group. I was happy beyond words. In case of an emergency, Black can make two eyes by playing the tesuji of Black E–White F–Black G.

Another idea at this point would be to play H instead of White 78. However, Black would then capture with 80, White would defend at 79, and Black at I would be enough. For this reason, I cannot agree with the idea of White switching to H with 78.

Move by move I was gaining. My lead was becoming clear.

Figure 5 (85–102). I was threatened.

Black 85 was a timely move, preparing to attack White.

White 90 was a subtle hane. I prudently held back with 91 even though I could have made a placement at 102. If Black 102–White A–Black 91–White B, then Black could play C.

After being separated with 93 and 95, White 96 is a very brave move. I was threatened, so I prudently played 97. However, if I had played 1 in *Dia. 10*, the game would have been quickly over. After catching three white stones with 5, Black can live at the top with the moves to 13. White must play 14, so it




Figure 5 (85-102)





Figure 6 (103-128)

would not be easy for White to attack the central black stones. I had read out the whole sequence completely, but I was nervous and afraid to play this way.




Dia. 10

Figure 6 (103-128). A bluff

Black 3 was a useless move; it was just a bluff. Dia. 11 was the simple way of playing. If White responded with 2, after exchanging 3 and 4, the game would be decided in my favor. I was not in control; my body was stiff praying for one more win.

Up to 12, White not only gets a stable position at the bottom, but he is also able to make a base on the right side by playing 14, 16, and 18. It's now unclear which side is winning.



Dia. 11

Black 21 and 23 were stiff moves. I played them because I wanted to play A, but then I felt it was too cheeky, so I changed course and played 25 and 27. That made them bad moves.

Even though White 28 was the proper move for this shape, it was not the kind of move Cho makes; it might even have been the losing move. The reason for this is given in the next figure.

Figure 7 (128-156). I'm going to win!

White 28 gave White's group unconditional life, but from 29 to 33, Black seals off the territory in the corner. I expected Cho would play 1 and 3 in Dia. 12. Black would attack White's base with 4 and 6, then fix the center with 8 and 10. Black would then seal off the right side 12. At this point White must make the decision whether or not to invade at 'b'. If White defends on the right side, Black 'a' is enough to win. Therefore, White has to invade at 'b'. If Black attacks at 'c', it is not clear what





Figure 7 (128-156)

would happen. The odds are 6 to 4 that Black could kill White's group, but I had no confidence I could kill it.




Dia. 12

When I took the last big point with Black 35, I felt that victory was within my grasp.

Against Black 39, White answered with 40, aiming at the placement of 44. White 1, 3, and 5 in *Dia. 13* looks better than White 44, but after Black 10, Black is clearly ahead by 1 1/2 or 2 1/2 points. Whether or not White 44 is good, it still has many points at which to aim.


In *Dia. 13*, I should mention that if White omits 7 and plays at 'a' instead, Black would play 'b'. White cannot play at 7; he must instead play the moves from 'c' to 'e', and the

black stones above will escape. In addition, I also had the option of playing at 'f'. These are the reasons I can say that I would be ahead by 1 1/2 or 2 1/2 points.




Dia. 13

Black 41 had a nice feeling. If White answered at 43, I had the counterattack of 42.



Dia. 14

White 46 was White's last attempt to save the game. If White makes the preparatory moves of 1 to 5 in *Dia. 14* first, Black would give way to White 7 with 8 because he has made profit on the right. If White simply plays 46 without the preparatory moves in *Dia. 14*, Black 47 is the only move.



Cho's push and cut with 54 and 56 were amazing moves. Simply making shape with 1 in *Dia. 15* would result in a lost game for White. After fixing the shape with 2 to 6, Black would then play A in the figure. Black 4 at 5 is also possible. The result is the same.

From this point, Cho's desperation moves didn't worry me any more. The feeling that I was winning was gradually turning into a certainty.





Figure 8 (157-177)

Figure 8 (157-177). Even now I can't believe I won the title.

Black 59. Connecting with 73 instead would have been safer.



Dia. 16


Instead of 74, if White plays 1 to 15 in *Dia. 16*, Black still wins by either 1 1/2 or 2 1/2 points.

The instant the game ended, a feeling of great happiness came over me. Now, a week after, I still can't believe that I have become the owner of the Kisei title. If someone calls me Kobayashi Kisei, I might think he's talking to someone else.

White resigns after Black 177.


(Kido, May 1995. Translated by Yoshikawa Takeshiro.)

Three Elementary Problems: Answers




Problem 1

Black 1, sacrificing two stones, is the correct answer. If White captures with 2, Black throws in at 1 with 3, and he cannot make two eyes because he is short of liberties.



Problem 2

The hane of Black 1 forces White to defend at 2. Black now makes his second eye with 3. Note that White cannot capture at A because Black will recapture in a snapback.



Problem 3

Making an eye with Black 1 is the correct answer. After this, White is short of liberties and has no move. Black 1 at 'a' results in a ko.

A New Publication on Go and Business **GO: AN ASIAN PARADIGM FOR BUSINESS STRATEGY**

by Yasuyuki Miura

Fifty years ago, Japan was completely devastated economically in the aftermath of World War II. Today it stands, with the United States, at the pinnacle of the economic world.

In this new and provocative book, Mr. Miura presents the thesis that it is the game of go which has provided the Japanese with the mind-set that has enabled them to succeed economically.

Mr. Miura shows how Japanese companies use their employees as generalists, like go stones, instead of as specialized chess pieces; how the Japanese give their children the basics of education through the use of *kata*, just like go players study joseki; how the Japanese *keiretsu* system of business organization has its roots in the organization of the go houses in Japan's feudal era.

Mr. Miura also draws on his personal ex-

periences in Japan, Iran, and the United States, as an executive for Japan Air Lines, to show how useful go strategy is for making business decisions, and how he used these strategic ideas as president of Nikko Hotels International to map out a strategy for establishing a chain of six hotels in North America.

Besides the insights into both go and business that Mr. Miura provides, this book can also serve as a beginner's introduction to the game. The rules are presented in a clear and concise format, with examples of joseki, fuseki, life-and-death, tesuji, and the endgame spaced throughout the text.

Finally, because of the many anecdotes of famous people and events taken from Japanese history, this book will give you a new look into the mind of the Japanese executive and the cultural milieu in which he lives.

US price: \$19.95 (plus \$1.25 s/h)

Now Available in the New Kiseido Edition

Reprints of two popular, long-out-of-print books
from the Ishi Press Elementary Go Series.

IN THE BEGINNING

The Opening in the Game of Go

by Ishigure Ikuro

The ideal introductory book on opening theory (*fuseki*).

US price: \$10.00 (plus \$1.25 s/h)

TESUJI

by James Davies

Contains more than 200 problems and examples to help you spot the right tactical moves in your games.

US price: \$12.00 (plus \$1.25 s/h)

Order from:

Kiseido Publishing Company

CPO Box 2126, Tokyo, Japan FAX +81-467-83-4710; e-mail: SGT00076@niftyserve.or.jp

USA: Kiseido, 454 Las Gallinas Ave., #255, San Rafael, CA 94903-3618; Tel: 415-499-1543; e-mail: kiseido@crl.com VISA and MC accepted. Include number and expiry date with your order.

Europe: Shaak en Gowinkel het Paard, Haarlemmerdijk 147, 1013 KH Amsterdam, Holland; TEL: +31-20-624-1171; FAX+31-20-627-0885.

The 33rd Judan Title Match

A third major title has been taken by a player from the new generation in a span of less than four months. On April 6, 1995, Yoda Norimoto beat Otake Hideo by half a point in the third game of the 33rd Judan title match, thereby taking the title by the lop-sided score of 3-0. Not only did Yoda win three straight games in this best-of-five series, Otake was forced to resign in the first two of them.

Otake has held this title four times altogether. He created a sensation himself when he first captured it from Sakata Eio in 1969 at the age of 26. He lost it the following year to Hashimoto Utaro, but he won it again in 1980 and held it for two terms. He captured it again last year by defeating Takemiya Masaki.

Before this match, there were fourteen encounters between Otake and Yoda, of which Otake won ten. In several of these games Yoda was winning, but Otake staged upsets. It wasn't that Otake played such good moves; rather, Yoda's moves were lukewarm. But Yoda is young and improving, while Otake, at the age of 52, may not be as sharp as he used to be. Therefore, everyone was watching to see how Yoda would perform in his first important title match.

But Black 29 was too strong a punch and Black dominated the game from this move on.




Figure 1 (1-45)

White 42 was a mistake; it might actually have been the losing move.

Against Black 43, White had no good response. According to Ishida Yoshio, White 44 was an overly patient move, after which Black confines White to the right with 45.

Game One

White: Otake Hideo Judan

Black: Yoda Norimoto 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 6 hours each


Played on March 9, 1995, in Urayasu, Chiba.

Figure 1 (1-45). White 42 was almost the losing move.


In this game, Yoda played the strongest he has ever played and, being the first game of a best-of-five match, the win he secured here was invaluable.

White 28 was the turning point of this opening. According to Ishida Yoshio, 29 was such a good point that White should have forestalled it by playing 28 at 44, waiting to see how Black would continue.

On facing a player from the new generation, Otake seems to be saying when he plays 28, 'Come on, Mr. Yoda. Defeat me if you can.'



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Instead of 44, is there anything better? If White plays 1 and 3 in Dia. 1, Black will cut through White's position with 4 and 6, aiming at White's shortage of liberties. Continuing in



Yoda Norimoto (left) wins the first game of the 33rd Judan title match. Joining in the post-game analysis are Ryu Shikun Tengen (seated far left) and Ishida Yoshio 9-dan (seated behind Otake's head).

Dia. 2, Black is able to capture the important marked white stones with the moves to 8.



Dia. 3

After the game, Otake showed *Dia. 3* as an alternative to White 42. After 7, Black probably would not play 'a' immediately. Although this result is not very good for White, it is better than White 42 and 44.

Figure 2 (46–79). Yoda's greedy move
After White 48, Yoda had a won game.

Playing Black A would be enough to wrap it up, but Black 49 was greedy. Yoda seems to have been willing to lose this game with an overplay, but he didn't want to lose it by making a passive move.

When Otake probed with 50, Yoda made another overplay with 51. It was now inevitable that a ko fight would occur.





Figure 2 (46–79)

62: takes ko at 54; 65, 68, 71: takes ko;
73 connects at 54



Dia. 4

According to Ishida, against the ko threat of 69, White 70 is questionable. Although 70 is territorially better, White should play at B instead. White is now unable to break out into the center with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4*, since Black can now counter the with the moves to 10 in sente. At this point, Otake seems to have lost his fighting spirit.





Figure 3 (80–137)
102: connects at 91


Figure 3 (80–137). A perfect win

Black has no weak stone, and he also has enough territory to win. Yoda caps at 81, going straight for victory. With White 82 and 84, Otake is looking for an honorable way to resign.



Dia. 5

Instead of 93, Black 1 in *Dia. 5* can capture three White stones. If White 'a', Black 'b'. If White 'c' instead of 2, Black 'd', White 'e'. Even though Yoda didn't choose this diagram, getting squeezed like he did in the game is miserable for White. After this, Yoda had the game clinched.



Dia. 6

After Black 137, Otake resigned. *Dia. 6* shows that even if White had continued with the stronger resistance of 1 here, Black 2 stops him from making two eyes.

White resigns after Black 137.

(Kido, May 1995. Translated by Yoshikawa Takeshiro.)

Game Two

White: Yoda Norimoto 9-dan

Black: Otake Hideo Judan

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 6 hours each

Played on March 22, 1995, in Matsuyama, Ehime prefecture.

Being more than 20 years his senior, Otake gave a lot of fatherly advice to Yoda during their encounter. For example, both players wore traditional kimonos during the three games of this title match. Otake, who is fond of wearing traditional clothing, noticed that

Yoda was wearing the same kimono in the second game that he wore in the first game. During the lunch break Otake advised Yoda: 'After you take off your kimono, you should iron out the wrinkles before putting it away.' On the go board, however, Otake was unable to advise him. In this area, Yoda was clearly Otake's equal in the heated battle going on there.




Figure 1 (1-67)

Figure 1 (1-67). *Sparks are flying*

Before playing 12, Black probed at 10.


The fighting began when Otake played the knight's move of 25, menacing White's two stones at the top. Up to here, Yoda played all of his moves very quickly, but he stopped and thought for 17 minutes before playing the ladder block at 26. He then cut through the knight's move with 28 and 30. The fighting now began in earnest.

Against 49, Yoda played a double hane with 50. This was a surprising move. It invites Otake to cut with 1 in *Dia. 1*, but he played 51 instead. If Black cut he would capture three white stones in the sequence to 7. White would then live in the top right corner with 8 and 10, ending with sente, since Black must defend with 11. Even though White has lost three stones, he has been able to make thickness in the center with his two hanes at 4 and 6, making an invasion at 'a' by Black remote.

If White connected at 54 instead of playing 50, Black would push out at 50 with 51.

Instead of 51, Black could have cut (at 54)

and captured the three white stones, but, according to Kudo 9-dan, Black would not have gotten a good result.



Dia. 1

Otake had used very little time in the opening, but after White played 66 he spent 12 minutes thinking before responding with the peep at 67.

Yoda thought over this move for a long time. When lunch time arrived, he still hadn't answered the peep.




Figure 2 (68-134)

Figure 2 (68-134). *A strong move*

Upon resuming the game after lunch, Yoda still continued to ponder his response to Black 67. After 41 minutes, he attached with 68, refusing to answer the peep. In the anteroom


all the observers let out a cheer.

Yoda: 'I couldn't find a good answer to the peep.'

Otake: 'After the attachment of Black 68, I was in trouble.'

White 70 was a good move, since it took away Black's eye shape. There was no good answer to this move, so Otake played 71 to 73 to make a path of retreat for his stones above, even though it helped White solidify his territory on the right.

After capturing three stones with 88 and 90, White had no weak stones on the board.



Dia. 2

Instead of 91, Black should have first played at 1 in *Dia. 2*. When White connects with 2, he can then play at 3 (91 in the figure). The cut at 'a' is scary, but Black would still be good even if he sacrifices two stones by playing at 'b'. In the game, when White captured the marked stone and 71, the balance of territory tilted in White's favor.

Figure 3 (135–194). *Fighting spirit*

At this point neither side had weak stones, so the end game had arrived. White is ahead and the diagonal connection at A, saving his three stones, is enough to win. Instead, Yoda started a ko fight by capturing with 70, then play 76 and 78. This showed his fighting spirit. This ko fight decided the game once and for all.

Black resigns after 194 moves.

Go Weekly, April 4, 1995. Translated by Yoshikawa Takeshiro)




Figure 3 (135–194)

82, 88: take ko (76); 85: takes ko (79);

91: captures three stones at 83

Game Three

White: Otake Hideo Judan

Black: Yoda Norimoto 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 6 hours each

Played on April 6, 1995, in Omachi, Nagano prefecture.




Figure 1 (1–34)

Figure 1 (1–34). *A long drawn-out game*


Up to Black 13, the moves were the same as in the first game. In that game, 14 was played as an approach move at A. By playing a pincer at 14, Otake changed the course of the game.

Takemiya: 'This move is more popular than the approach move.'

Up to 24, the moves flowed smoothly. In the previous two games, the tempo in the opening was fast-paced, but here it slowed down considerably with White 24.

Instead of connecting at Black 25, Takemiya and Komatsu Hideki showed *Dia. 1* as one possible variation. These were the moves the observers were expecting Yoda to play.

After Yoda played 25, the moves to White 32 were inevitable, with White settling his stones.



Dia. 1

6: takes ko to the left of 3

After Black 33 and White 34, a long and drawn out game can be expected.




Figure 2 (35-49)

Figure 2 (35-49). Refusing to fight

After the sequence to 39 at the top, Otake takes a big point with 40. Yoda didn't think long before invading. However, Takemiya did not like this move because White's territory to the left of 40 was open at the bottom. Instead of 41, he suggested Black A-White B-Black C.

Otake invited a fight by playing the knight's move, expecting Black to cut through the knight's move just like White 28 and 30 in Game Two. However, because the ladder was unfavorable, Yoda declined to fight and simply played 43 and 45, making good shape. Otake also made good shape with 46. This last move implies an invasion in the lower right corner, so Yoda defended with 47. The game would be decided in the endgame.

After Black answered the forcing move of 48 with 49, Otake paused and thought for a long time. No one really knew where the next move should be played.

Takemiya: 'White D is a good steady move, but it's a bit slow. The next move is hard to anticipate.'




Figure 3 (50-100)

Figure 3 (50-100). Otake takes the lead.

After lunch, Otake capped with 50.

After Black 51, White 52 aims at 56. However, Yoda did not answer, but instead played 53 and 55.

Yoda: 'I wanted to play my own moves. If I can't read out the variations completely, I will play another way.'

Otake was grumbling to himself: 'I've lost

the psychological battle.'

I don't know if this comment is true or not, but the fighting from 56 to 71 was very difficult and the observers were critical of White. The question was whether White could make sabaki. But when White was able to get a ponnuki with 72, all criticism ceased: the consensus was that White was good. It was now Black who was being criticized.

White 78 was praised as a strong move, expected of a player of Otake's caliber. Suddenly, Otake took a big chunk of territory with 88 and 90. However, with 99, Black also mapped out a big area.





Figure 4 (101-225)

116: connects to the right of 22

Figure 4 (101-225). Otake misses his chance.
When White played 6, the observers

changed their judgment of the game from being close to being bad for Black. The effect of the ponnuki had gradually become stronger and stronger. But White made a regrettable mistake when he played 30.

Otake: 'This was the losing move.'



Dia. 2

Komatsu: 'Instead of 30, if White played 1 in Dia. 2, White 5 would become sente and he would have clearly won.'

Otake missed this sequence, so the game would now be decided by a half point. The observers predicted it would be a half-point win for White, but Yoda played tenaciously. Indeed, Black 89 was a good endgame move and Yoda was able to win by a half point.

225 moves. Black wins by half a point.

(Go Weekly, April 18, 1995. Translated by Yoshikawa Takeshiro)


Ten Proverbs Every Go Player Should Know

(Continued from page 62)

Proverb 10 One eye beats no eyes.

Black wins a capturing race by making an eye with 1. After Black 3, if White 'a', Black plays 'b', and White cannot play at 'c' because he is short of liberties. If Black fills the liberty at 3 with 1, Black loses when White plays at 1.

(Kido, March 1995. Translated by Okuma Osamu)




Correct Answer

Important Stones and Useless Stones

by Takagi Shoichi

If you read the last installment, you no doubt understand the difference between important stones and useless stones. However, stones that are useless sometimes have a lot of scope for maneuvering and they can be troublesome if not handled correctly. This is the theme that I would like to take up in this installment.




Dia. 1

Dia. 1 (High handicap games)


This example comes from one of my teaching games. The sequence from White 1 to Black 14 often occurs in games with handicaps of six stones or more. Black 8 and 10 seem to be tesuji, but I cannot say that Black got a good result.

Dia. 2 (The correct order of moves)

In *Dia. 1*, Black did not play the correct order of moves. He should first exchange 1 for White 2 before playing 3 and 5. White 6 is now the only move and, after Black plays 7 and 9, the useless marked white stone is perfectly insulated from its allies below. There is no electric charge passing between them. Of course, Black's marked stone and the one at 3 have also become useless stones, but these stones can be thought of as sacrifice stones used to get a good position above.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Let's now examine the continuation from *Dia. 1* and see how the difference of one move changes White's prospects at the top right.

Dia. 3 (The rank of useless stones)

White jumps to 1, forcing Black to connect his stones with 2 and 4. I'd like you to carefully look at this diagram for a moment.

The marked black stone is useless. Although it has not been completely insulated, it has very little scope for maneuver. The marked white stone is also useless. I'm sure that you understand this. But what about after White plays 1 and 3. We cannot yet say that these have become important stones, but tentatively, we can call them important.

Dia. 4 (Answering a bad move with a bad move)


White has come to the aid of a useless stone with 1. How can Black punish White's bad move? How about cutting with 2?

This is the worst possible move. White can now make sabaki with 3 and 5. Black loses much more in the corner than he gains by capturing one useless stone with 2 and 4.


Dia. 5 (White is in trouble)

Against White 1, taking away White's base

with 2 is a severe attack. If White answers with 3, Black solidifies his territory at the top with 4 while attacking White's stones. By helping the useless marked stone with 1, White has gotten into trouble.




Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Dia. 6 (A good result for White)

What happens if White moves out with 1? Such a move is often seen. If Black cuts with 2, White nimbly plays 3 and 5. If Black 6, White plays 7 and 9. If Black connects the ko at the marked stone, White plays 'a'. This is a good result for White.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7


Dia. 7 (White can't make sabaki)

Black 2 is a good answer to White 1. Cutting just lets White make sabaki. With Black 2, there is no need to worry about White making sabaki. White has been contained just as in Dia. 5.


Dia. 8 (The diagonal connection)

If White plays the diagonal connection of 1,

Black again answers with 2. If Black cuts with 2 at 'a' instead, White would play 'b', Black 'c', White 2. This is an excellent result for White.



Dia. 8




Dia. 9

Dia. 9 (Sabaki)


A strong player would attach at 1, hoping that Black cuts with 2, and get sabaki with 3. This is a terrible result for Black. Just as in Dia. 4, Black is capturing a useless stone while losing profit elsewhere.

Dia. 10 (How the game continued)

In the game, Black answered White 1 with 2. There may be more severe responses, but Black 2 is not a bad move. After Black 4 and 6, White moves out into the center with 7. At this point, please think about what part of the board White should play next.




Dia. 10



Dia. 11

Dia. 11 (White makes shape)


If Black cuts with 1, capturing a useless stone, White answers by playing 2, then making shape with 4 and 6. If Black cuts at 'a', White neatly sacrifices another stone by playing at 'b'.



Dia. 12

Dia. 12 (Great danger)

I don't know what he was thinking, but in the game, Black tried to extract his marked stone with 1 and 3. After White answers with 2 and 4, the black group in the center of the right side is in great danger. Saving the useless marked stone is certainly not worth this risk.



Dia. 13

Dia. 13 (What to do with useless stones)

Even though the marked black stone is useless and insulated from its allies, it still has some aji. If you want to use this aji, now is the time to use it. Black should push from the outside with 1 and 3. If White next extends to 'a', Black will push at 'b', confining White to the right side. Black could also extend to 'c', aiming to attack the white group above. If White plays 2 at 'd', Black will jump to 'b'. These are strong moves.

The 17th World Amateur Go Championship

(Continued from page 64)

Figure 3 (101-165)

Black 103 is evidence that Park is a very strong player. The purpose behind this move is to make the white stones heavy, enabling him to reduce White's moyo later on.

Even after White 112, Black is still ahead, but slowly he loses points. Black 133 and on succeed in capturing four white stones later, but he loses two stones first and the chance to turn the center into territory.

Sakai referred to Black 143 and the sequence that followed as 'small potatoes'. The sequence is actually very clever, but it loses points.




Figure 4 (166-241)

209: at 205; 218: left of 106; 241: below 139

Figure 4 (166-241)

Sakai commented that there were probably numerous places where either side could have gained another point or so.

In the end, White manages to pull off the nearly impossible: winning by half a point. 'The old fox did it again.'

Basically, the same kind of game was fought between Hirata and Ronald Schlemper, the Dutch representative. The latter was ahead for most of the game, but Hirata kept hanging in there, going all out the whole game. Trying to avoid complications, Schlemper kept giving in little by little and wasted close to 10 points in the endgame. He lost by 3 1/2 points.

(Continued on page 57)


An Introduction to Tesuji: Answers

Shortage of Liberties

When you fill the liberties of your opponent's stones you can capture them. Of course, your opponent is aware of this, too, and will do everything he can to thwart your plans, so you must use skill and guile to accomplish your aim. This means you must play *tesuji*. Here we will learn some tesujis in which you can make your opponent's stones short of liberties, enabling you to capture them.

Problem 1. The snapback

The snapback (*uttegaeshi* in Japanese) is a spectacular tesuji when seen through the eyes of a beginner. The reason is that it is not necessary to look many moves ahead and it results in the capture of three or more stones. The blind spot for the beginner is that he has to give up a stone to set up the capture.




Dia. 1

Dia. 1 (The correct answer)


Black throws in a stone with 1. This puts the two marked white stones in atari.

Dia. 2 (White captures)

White has no other move but to capture with 2, but...




Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Dia. 3 (Short of liberties)

White's four marked stones now have only one liberty, and Black captures them with 1.




Dia. 4

Dia. 4 (Only two stones)

Of course, Black can capture two stones


with 1, but White saves the other two with 2. It should be clear that playing 1 in Dia. 1, leading to the capture of four stones in Dia. 3, is much better.



Dia. 5

Dia. 5 (First application)


White has played atari with the marked stone. Of course, Black can capture at 'a', but there is a better way.



Dia. 6

Dia. 6 (Tesuji)


Black should play an atari himself with 1. If White captures at 'a', Black will recapture to the left of 'a'.



Dia. 7

Dia. 7 (Second application)


This position is a bit more difficult. The marked black stone is in atari, but Black does not want to save it. Instead, he can use it to set up a snapback.



Dia. 8

Dia. 8 (Atari)

Black first ataris the marked white stone with 1.



Dia. 9


Dia. 9 (If White connects)

If White connects with 1, Black 2 sets up a

snapback position. White is left with one liberty whether or not he captures the marked black stone.

Problem 2. Chase and capture

The tesuji in this problem is called *oiotoshi*. The literal meaning in Japanese is 'chase and capture'. This tesuji is used to capture the tail of a group that seems to be connected to a main body of stones.




Dia. 1 (Tesuji)

The moves of Black 1 and 3 are the tesuji.

Dia. 2 (Can't connect)

This is the position we come to after the moves in Dia. 1. If White connects at 'a', he is captured by Black 'b'. If White connects at 'b', Black captures four stones by playing at 'a'.



Dia. 3 (Failure)


If Black simply plays atari with 1, White connects at 2, and his group at the edge has three liberties and cannot be captured. The sacrifice in Dia. 1 is the same as having forced White to play both 2 and 'a' here.

Dia. 4 (First application)

This shape is a bit more complicated than the problem diagram, but the problem is the same: capture the four white stones at the top left. Don't be fooled by the marked black stone that is in atari.

Dia. 5 (The same shape)

The weak point of this shape is the same as before: Black 1. If White captures with 2, we get essentially the same shape as Dia. 1.




Dia. 5

Dia. 6

Dia. 6 (Variation)

What happens if White captures the marked stone with 2?



Dia. 7


Dia. 8

Dia. 7 (Snapback)

White has fallen into a snapback. White is short of liberties and Black captures five white stones with 1.

Dia. 8 (Second application)

If Black defends at 'a', White connects at 'b' and his stones are safe. You have to force White to lose a liberty in the corner.



Dia. 9


Dia. 10

Dia. 9 (Tesuji)

Black 1 is the tesuji. White must capture at 2 and Black ataris at 3. If White connects at 1, Black 'a' is atari on six white stones. If White captures at 3, we have a typical snapback situation. You can see it, of course.

Dia. 10 (Third application)


You can find *oiotoshi* situations in the center of the board as well as on the edge and in the corner. This time you want to capture the three marked white stones.



Dia. 11

Dia. 11 (Tesuji)

Black 1 is the tesuji you need to capture the three white stones.




Dia. 12

Dia. 12 (The Crane's Nest)

If White tries to escape with 1 and 3, Black blocks his exit with 2 and 4, putting five white stones into atari. Even if White connects, his stones will still be in atari. The position is called 'The Crane's Nest'.

Problem 3. A geta tesuji


This problem is similar to the geta tesujis we studied in the first installment of this series in Go World 72. However, it does relate to the theme of shortening your opponent's liberties.



Dia. 1

Dia. 1 (A vulgar move)


Black can save his stones at the top by pushing out with 1 and 3, then capturing with 'a'. However, after 4, White can atari at 'b' and threaten the black stones on the right.



Dia. 2

Dia. 2 (The clamp tesuji)


Black attaches with 1, but he is really aiming at some other stones: the two white one to the right.



Dia. 3

Dia. 3 (Captured)


White must connect at 1. Black 2 now catches two white stones. If White 1 at 2, Black ataris at 1.



Dia. 4

Dia. 4 (A related shape)


You should now be able to easily solve this problem. Black to capture the marked white stone.



Dia. 5

Dia. 5 (The vital point)

Just like in Dia. 2, Black 1 is on the vital point. The marked white stone can no longer escape.



Dia. 6

Dia. 6 (Captured)

If White connects with 1, Black plays 2 and the white stone is dead. If White 1 at 'a', Black plays 'b'.

(Let's Go, February 1994. Translated by Richard Bozulich)

The 17th World Amateur Go Championship

(Continued from page 54)

The lesson seems to be that initial success makes for a weak psychological state and vice versa. Psychology is the name of the game.

It is very enjoyable to see Sakai at work. As a referee he observes the games and often


knows better than the players themselves what the sequences were in their games; i.e., they would play the games in front of him, but occasionally make mistakes in the order, which Sakai then corrects. Often he already knows exactly where the player lost and he never shies away from expressing his views.

Ten Proverbs Every Go Player Should Know

by Kato Masao

Below are ten problems which you can easily solve if you know the right proverb.


How to Use Kikashi Stones



Problem 1. White to play

White has played the marked stones as forcing moves. Black has answered them within his territory, so any advantage White gains from them, no matter how small, should be satisfactory. How should White continue?


Where to extend?



Problem 2. Black to play

Both Black and White would like to extend along the top. It is Black's turn to play. Where should he extend, to A, B, or C?


Vital Points



Problem 3. Black to play

Black 1 is a good attacking move. White responds with 2 and 4, and it seems as if White's group can easily escape because of the cutting point at 'a'. However, White's group is also weak, so instead of worrying about your own weak points, pay some attention to White's weaknesses. There is a vital point that White wants to play, but if Black can beat him to it, he will take the lead.

Look at the Whole Board




Problem 4. Black to play

Both Black and White have jumped out into the center with 1 and 2. Because White is

one move ahead, Black might feel as if he is under attack. But you must not become faint-hearted. If you look at the whole board, you will see that Black has thickness at the top. If Black launches an attack using this thickness, the position will turn to Black's advantage.


The vital points of attack and defense

Many proverbs advise us how to attack and defend in local situations. For example, if you are caught in a crosscut, there is a proverb that will guide you in finding the right move. Before looking at the answers and proverbs, try solving the following problems.




Problem 5. Black to play

If you know this proverb, you will play the next move without hesitation.



Problem 6. Black to play

White has crosscut with the marked stone. Where should Black play?




Problem 7. Black to play

White cuts with the marked stone. What is the purpose of this cut?


The vital points of life and death

The next three problems deal with life and death and capturing races. The proverbs that relate to capturing races involve two important tactical principles. The proverb about life and death will be useful to you beyond measure.




Problem 8. Black to play

If you know the proverb, you will be confronted with two choices, but only one of them is correct.



Problem 9. Black to play

Which liberties does Black fill? If Black plays carelessly, it will be his stones that die instead of White's.




Problem 10. Black to play

Black's six stones are in a capturing race with White's five. If you know the proverb, this is an easy problem, but if you don't, you might think the black stones are lost.


Proverb 1

Don't escape with junk stones!



Failure

Stones which have been used as forcing moves have completed their work and, as such, should be regarded as 'junk' stones. However, they still have some aji remaining, and it is this aji that you must try to exploit. Escaping with 1 and 3 is out of the question. Not only do White's stones become a target to attack, but, after Black 2 and 4, the two white stones on the lower right side have come under attack.




Correct Answer

The sequence from White 1 to 9 utilizes the aji of the white 'junk' stones. Finally, Black must defend the cutting point at 'a' by playing 8 and White has been able to make nice thickness in the center.


Proverb 2

Don't approach thickness!




Correct Answer

The narrow extension of Black 1 is the best move. Even though White can make an ideal extension from his thickness with 2, he is unable to make a moyo after Black plays 3 and 5.



Dia. 1 Greedy

Black 1 is a bit greedy. It leaves room for White to invade at 2 and 4. White will have no trouble making a live group at the top and the thickness Black gets will be nullified by White's thickness on the left.




Dia. 2 Overplay

Black 1 is an overplay. The closer Black's extension to White's thickness is, the more severe the invasion will become.


Proverb 3

**The opponent's vital point
is my vital point.**




Correct Answer

Black 1 is the White's vital point: it forces White to play 2, inducing Black to connect at 3. White must still play 4 to defend against the cut. White's stones are heavy and lack eye shape, so Black will launch a large-scale attack at 'a' or 'b'.



Failure 1

Connecting at Black 1 is a passive move. White 2 is the vital point for making shape. Once White plays on this point, Black has no way to attack White.




Failure 2

Black 1 looks like a severe move, but it is not the vital point. If White blocked at 'a', then a peep at 2 would be effective, but once White has played 2, his group becomes stable.


Proverb 4

Attacking is the best means of defence



Failure

Jumping to 1 is an ordinary move, lacking any kind of a plan. After White jumps to 2, Black has no good follow-up to attack White's group. Moreover, Black's moyo at the top has been reduced.




Correct Answer

Capping at 1 is a strong move. Black gets a big chunk of territory in the center with the moves to 13 and he should have no difficulty saving his group in the lower right, since he can block at 'a' or attach at 'b'.

Proverb 5

Play hane at the head of two stones!




Solution

Black 1, at 'the head of two stones', blocking White's extension into the center, has great power. The two-step hane of Black 3 is now a stylish move. After 5, Black has the advantage.

Proverb 6

When caught in a crosscut, extend!




Solution

Extending to Black 1 is a calm move. Now there are no longer any complications: the moves to 7 are all logical, and Black has no reason to be dissatisfied. If Black carelessly ataris with 1, White will get a good position.

Proverb 7

Capture the cutting stone!




Solution

It is usually good to capture the stone your opponent cuts with. The ponnuki you get by capturing one stone not only is thick, it also becomes an eye. The reason White cut with the marked stone was to become thick on the outside by cutting with 2, then playing 4 and 6. If White cuts at 2 without playing the marked stone, Black would capture at 'a', sacrificing two stones in the corner.

Proverb 8

There's death in the hane.




Solution

A hane narrows the opponent's territory, making it harder to find space for two eyes. White's hane of 1 from the left is the correct answer. After Black 2, White hanes again with 3. If Black 4, White can play 5. If White 1 at 3, Black 'a', White 1, and Black lives with 'b'. If White plays 1 at 4, Black descends to 3 and lives.

Proverb 9

Fill the outside liberties first!



Solution

Black can capture White's stones by taking the outside liberties with 1. If Black plays an inside liberties at 'a' or 'b' with 1, his stones will be captured. Playing on inside liberties can cause you to lose your own liberties; it is the same as attacking yourself.

(Continued on page 51)

The 17th World Amateur Go Championship

The 17th World Amateur Go Championship was held at the Nihon Ki-in's headquarters in Ichigaya, Tokyo from May 23 to May 26. Sponsored by Japan Airlines, this event brings together go players from all over the world. This year players from 44 countries took part, and it was one of the most exciting tournaments yet.

Up through the sixth round, it looked as if Kan Ying, from Hong Kong, was a sure bet to win the championship. She had beaten both Hirata Hironori of Japan and Park Sung Kyun of Korea. Even though she lost to China's Shi Hong Yi in the 7th round, she was still ahead on SOS points. Nobody expected her to lose her game in the 8th and final round, but Jong Moon Lee of the USA pulled off a surprising upset and defeated Kan by half a point. This meant that the winner of the championship would be decided by the game that was going on between Hirata (Japan) and Park (Korea), since both were ahead of China on SOS points. In this closely fought game, Hirata Hironori eked out a victory, also by half a point, and finally won the title of World Amateur Go Champion after four third-place finishes in previous championships.

China's Shi Hong Yi came second and Kan Ying barely managed to get third place, just ahead of Park Sung Kyun, because of her better SOS points. Jong Moon Lee finished fifth and Taipei's Wang Wen Heng came in sixth, both with six wins. Also finishing in the top eight were Bo Keun Chi of Australia and Egbert Rittner of Germany.

Here is the game between Japan and Korea that decided this year's champion.

White: Hirata Hironori (Japan)

Black: Park Sung Kyun (Korea)

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 1 1/2 hours each

Date: May 26, 1995.

Commentary by Rob van Zeijst, based on an analysis by Sakai Takeshi 9-dan and Hirata.

Sakai served as the referee during the tournament and put many hours into commenting

on the games. He is respected by top professionals for the correctness and thoroughness of his comments.




Figure 1 (1-52)

Figure 1 (1-52)

White 6 and the moves that follow constitute a relatively new joseki that presently enjoys popularity among professionals.


Hirata commented he had never played the joseki that follows after White 18.

The moves to 25 look natural. Using White 26 at 27 seems like a feasible strategy, but the white stones around 18 will become thin after Black jumps to the left of 34. The combination of White 26 and 28 is a set pattern.

Black would now like to be able to play as in *Dia. 1*. The moves up to Black 9 are forced. White can now choose between the severe move of 10 or he can jump at A. White 10, however, seems to do the job. If Black chooses the most severe sequence of 13 and 15, he doesn't seem to be able to win the *semeai*. Another possibility for Black is to play 15 at B. White will then defend at C. Black now has to live on the side, allowing White to escape with D, which is similar to what happened in the game. The important difference is that Black lost all chances of attacking the white group around 18 in the figure.

Therefore, Black 31 is forced. Black 33 is now severe. Black 35 looks crude, but it turns

out to be very effective in combination with 37. Sakai added that a professional would have trouble finding this combination — apparently wanting to stress its crudeness.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

White 40 is big, but too early. White forgot to make a couple of important exchanges. First of all, he should have pushed at 1 as in *Dia. 2*, creating weaknesses in Black's shape. After Black defends at 2, White also defend with 3. Playing 3 at B (as in the game) is bad style. Next Black 4. and White invades with 5. The difference from the game is manifold, the most important one being that White later has the option of capturing the marked black stone by playing at A. For the sake of argument, we assume the same sequence, 5 to 14 in *Dia. 2*, that occurred in the game. Of course, Black can try to resist by blocking on the other side, but the two marked white stones are a source of worry for Black. Black 41, therefore, was a splendid forcing move. White should have played 42 at 3 in *Dia. 2*.

Figure 2 (53–100)

Black 53 is another crude move, but it is unexpectedly severe. In the fight that follows, White is forced to sacrifice his center stones. Black 59 is unnecessary — it fixes the shape making it easy for White to decide where to defend.

White 64 is small. Hirata showed some clever tricks if Black is to resist at 68, but Sakai completely ignored them. He was only concerned with the floating White stones in the center. After Black defends at 69, the white center stones have almost totally lost their *aji*.




Figure 2 (53–100)

White 70 to 74. White is desperately trying to catch up.

Black 75 is too easy on White. Black should have played somewhere around A or simply at B with this move.

White 76 goes all out. After White 84, Black only gets a small low position on the left.

Black 85 loses points. It's better to try to make territory in the center. The point two spaces to the left of 73 accomplishes this and also neutralize the white stones at 82 and 84.

The invasion Black had prepared so carefully with 85 and 87 only served to give White a chance to make center territory. White 96 to 100 are a good combination. Trying to capture all of Black's stones seems unreasonable.




Figure 3 (101–165)

(Continued on page 54)

The First FOST Cup: World Open Computer Go Championship

FOST

¥2,000,000 (US\$24,000) 1st prize

¥500,000 (US\$6,000) 2nd prize

¥200,000 (US\$2,400) 3rd prize

Other prizes will also be awarded.

Sponsored by:

Foundation for Fusion of Science and Technology (FOST)

The Japan Computer Go Association (JCGA)

The Japan Go Association (Nihon Ki-in)

Date: September 29-30, 1995

Place: The Japanese Go Association
headquarters at Ichigaya, Tokyo

All computer go programmers are invited to participate in this championship. The main conditions are:

- 1) Participant must be the principal programmer of the entered program.
- 2) Only one program is allowed per person.
- 3) Participants should provide a computer for their programs on site. (Remote login is NOT allowed.) If the participant is unable to bring a computer, FOST will provide one for a modest fee.
- 4) Programs running on computers with serial ports should be capable of communicating with other programs using Standard Go Modem Protocol originally written by Bruce Wilcox. If your machine does not have a serial port, you can still participate, but there may be some penalty.

5) The rules used in this tournament will be the Japanese rules.

6) Each side will have one hour to complete their moves. (No extension of time will be given). The result will be determined by the tournament director (a professional go player).

If you wish to participate in this tournament, contact the Japan Computer Go Association as soon as possible with your name, address, telephone, FAX and e-mail numbers, and name of your program. In July we will send you the tournament booklet containing the exact rules and other information by ordinary mail.

Contact: Richard Bozulich

E-mail: MHB00531@niftyserve.or.jp

Snail-mail: Japan Computer Go Association
Ishigami Kugenuma 1-5-17-702, Fujisawa City,
Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan 251;

FAX: +81-466-27-3012 or +81-467-83-4710

ING'S STONES WITH BOWLS

Bowls

- Contain ascending and descending measuring devices
- Elegant; guaranteed high quality
- Strong and durable at a reasonable price
- Light compact design

Stones

- Smooth, looks like porcelain
- Filled with lead; uniform quality
- The fill-in-to-count score is clear at a glance
- Simple and reasonable; even children can easily learn

No More Missing or Broken Stones

NEW STYLE
JW100



Remove lid



Place lid
upside down



Place con-
tainer over lid.



Carrying bag:
add \$2.00



Prices

Stones: \$19.95

Board: \$29.95

Ing's Electronic Voice Timer: \$79.00

Official Distributor

Yutopian Enterprises, 4964 Adagio Court, Fremont, Ca 94538 USA
FAX: 510-770-8913; TEL: 510-659-0138; HOTLINE: 1-800-YUTOGO-3

Produced by The Ing Chang-Ki Goe Educational Foundation

4F Kuang Fu Building, No. 35 Kuang Fu South Road, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C.
TEL: 886-2-761-4117 FAX: 886-2-768-6940